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The United States and President Donald Trump’s decision to assassinate Qassem Soleimani, Iran’s top military commander, on January 3 sent shockwaves through the international community.  The brazen political assassination of Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force and second most important political figure in Iran, has massive implications for both world politics, the Middle East region, and Iran.


President Trump’s predictably unpredictable foreign policy decisions persist, making any predictions about the United States’ short-term actions on Iran immensely difficult. 


Before Iran responded with force to Soleimani’s assassination, Trump tweeted, “Let this serve as a WARNING that if Iran strikes any Americans, or American assets, we have targeted 52 Iranian sites… at a very high level & important to Iran & the Iranian culture, and those targets, and Iran itself, WILL BE HIT VERY FAST AND VERY HARD.”  However, after Iran’s formal response in the form of two ballistic missile attacks against American military bases in Iraq, Trump responded with further economic sanctions in favour of further military action.


This historical incident has left pundits, analysts, politicians, and citizens flat-footed, and it serves as the perfect example in the difficulty of precisely predicting current American foreign movements.  Trump’s unpredictability is his most reliable trait, and while it seems he was persuaded by the extremely hawkish and warmongering action of killing a foreign country’s top military commander at the international airport of an American ally, he has also in the past spouted the rhetoric of anti-war American isolationism.


Surprisingly, what is perhaps easier to read into is what Iran’s plans and next moves may be.  The increased economic sanctions and American military blustering throw the Iran nuclear deal, an agreement Trump already left, for all intents and purposes in the bin.


European allies insist that they remain committed to the deal, but it is hard to imagine Iran will be too happy considering NATO’s and many European leader’s responses.


Iran not pursuing nuclear arms would seem counterintuitive at this point.  Iranian officials supportive of developing nuclear weapons will feel galvanized, and those against will likely either be convinced or sidelined.


Of course, Iran still has a delicate game to play when it comes to domestic, regional, and global politics.


Internal Iran


With the Iranian military on high alert after responding to the Soleimani killing, Iran shot down a Ukrainian passenger plane and killed 176 civilians including 82 Iranians.


Iran’s initial denial and the action itself will damage its reputation internationally, and perhaps more importantly, it increased civil unrest around the regime.  Media across the globe reported that thousands of protestors took to the streets to protest the Supreme Leader and the downing of the passenger plane.


Add the unrest to another potential economic downturn at the hands of further American sanctions, and the Iranian government faces a difficult short-term future.


Iran initially reported that its missile attack against the United States caused deadly damage, likely to shore up support.  However, the United States and its allies later reported that no injuries or deaths were suffered.


Domestic unrest may pull Iran to make different calculations about regional partners and what economic and military possibilities exist in the Middle East.


Deepening of Regional Conflicts?


Leading up to the Soleimani’s assassination, Saudi-Iranian tensions had been changing course.  Saudi Arabia was showing more openness to exploring diplomatic channels to reduce hostility between the two most powerful countries in the region.


Saudi Arabia has been enjoying strong ties with America under a Trump White House, and the Saudis have played a pivotal role in America’s strategy vis-à-vis Iran.  Proxy wars between the Saudis and Iranians have devastated neighbouring countries and generally destabilized the Middle East.


A thawing of tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran should have been a welcome opportunity to bring more stability and peace to the region.  However, America’s actions will change triangulations from both sides.


In fact, Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi said Soleimani was on a diplomatic mission in Iraq when he was killed.  Abdul-Mahdi, serving as the mediator between the two regional powers, said Soleimani was delivering a message for the Saudis.  American Secretary of State Mike Pompeo rejected the idea that Soleimani could have been serving diplomatic ends.


Iranian officials may now be extremely wary of Saudi Arabia and any further diplomatic option.   And while Iran’s military response to America was measured, Iran will likely view American allies in the region as a more attainable target for retribution if they are so inclined.


Increasing tensions may spell profits for arms dealers, but further proxy wars and conflicts between the two regional powers could damage Saudi Arabia’s economy, along with wreaking havoc on wherever the conflict may take place.


This instability is occurring against the backdrop of Saudi Arabia’s immense push to diversify its economy by throwing money into the tourism sector.  Any disruptions in the region have the potential to tank Saudi Arabia’s most important economic move in decades.


The Global Future


While Soleimani’s assassination further restricts Iran’s options on ways to proceed, the United States and its allies, namely Saudi Arabia, can still try to change course and limit any further marching towards war.


This is certainly a difficult proposition considering the United States under President Trump tore up the agreement that sought to limit Iran’s access to nuclear weapons in return for opening up Iran economically to the West.


But the rhetoric pronouncing an inevitable march towards war was immediately proven wrong by both the relatively measured immediate military response by Iran, and Trump’s relative de-escalation of tensions after threatening to commit war crimes against Iran.


America’s decision to assassinate Soleimani should be viewed as a major misstep, one that derails potential diplomatic gains and heats up tensions in an undeniable manner.


However, diplomatic solutions are not off the table and both sides stand to gain if they set aside their immense differences.  Recent events have cast Iran-Saudi relations in doubt, but a close eye on future decisions by both sides is

Economy, Geopolitics

On 15 November, the Iranian government announced a 50% hike in petrol prices, and angry Iranians took to the streets to air their grievances.  Protestors blocked roads, disrupted traffic and businesses, and marched against the current government.


The Islamic Revolutionary Guard responded with brutal force and killed an estimated 180 protestors, with some estimates going all the way up 450 civilian deaths.  The government also responded by shutting off the internet for the majority of the country, resulting in a disruption of the Iranian economy and many people’s daily lives.


The unrest comes at the end of a particularly difficult 2019 for the Iranian government, a year marked by increasing international and regional tensions that have damaged the economy and the well-being of its citizens.


Iran continues to face challenges from Saudi Arabia and its regional allies, and the shift in American policy has thrown the Iranian economy into uncertainty.  These factors have collided with the stagnating price of oil and the difficulty Iran has had in diversifying its economy away from oil dependence.




One of the biggest questions for those observing the region will be: are the protests a bigger sign of change within the country?


Hawkish Western foreign policy analysts have long been hoping and praying for and often predicting that Iran is ripe for regime change, but the immense power behind the Islamic Revolutionary Guard has been able to stamp out any unrest over the years.


The recent protests were characterised by the New York Times as the deadliest political unrest in the country since the Islamic Revolution 40 years ago.  Also, worth noting about the recent unrest is that much of it is targeted at the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.


However, with the concentration of power in the state and military, it is hard to imagine an organic people’s revolution rising up without massive bloodshed.  Iran has time and again shown it is willing to forcefully suppress political dissent and the step to shut down the internet indicates the government is prepared to withstand considerable economic collateral damage to consolidate power.


But Iran’s economy will continue to limp under American sanctions, and an inflation rate of above 40% is preventing many Iranians from saving or conducting any meaningful economic activity.


Europe’s Response


The European Union has taken quite a different line to that of the Americans in their foreign policy approach to Iran.  After President Trump unilaterally left the Iran nuclear deal, the European Union has become the staunchest supporter of the multilateral agreement that seeks to prevent Iran from making a nuclear weapon.


Despite misgivings about Iran’s activities with its nuclear developments, the European Union has remained committed to the deal.  Of course, this entails facilitating economic trade within the country, the greatest incentive Iran has to abide by the deal.


The United States’ decision to abandon the deal deeply hurt Iran’s economic forecasts and the slack has had to be picked up by the EU.  In turn, the EU has had to be more lenient in the eyes of some.


Embattled Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took umbrage with the Union’s unwavering support of the Iran deal in the face of the recent crackdown of Iranian protestors.  Israel and the United States have been the biggest detractors of Iran, along with the Saudis.


It does place the Europeans in a difficult spot, one in which their relative lack of military force is made up for by their promise of economic improvement.  However, the European market may only be able to prop up Iran’s economy for so long, and Iranian citizens will be likely to take to the streets again if conditions don’t improve.


Furthermore, despite the European Union being one of the most important proponents of the nuclear deal, Iran is still not always thrilled about their actions.  In fact, Iran has threatened to abandon the deal if the Union triggers deeper economic sanctions.


Some European leaders have also expressed misgivings with the deal largely due to domestic political pressure due to what many argue has been an overreach by the Iranian government in terms of the safety of Iranian expatriates.




Iran’s neighbour Iraq has also been plunged into civil unrest in recent weeks, with some protesters specifically targeting what they see as an outsized Iranian presence in their country. 


While the Iraqi government has drawn much of the attention, many protestors have been calling for not only an ousting of the current political ruling elite but also of what they view as Iranian interference.


Anti-Iranian protestors went so far as to storm the Iranian consulate in Baghdad and replace the Iranian flag with an Iraqi one.


Iran has long been a supporter of the Iraqi regime, and in its recent downfall, protestors have pointed to Iran as part of the larger political problem within Iraq.


The Iraqi Parliament officially accepted Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi’s resignation on 1 December, but protestors have pledged to continue their fight until all of their demands are met.


Iraqi unrest does not bode well for Iran in its hopes to quell unrest within Iranian borders, and while the Iranian state has more resources at its disposal to use violence against protestors, outside factors could limit the stomach the supreme leader has for killing his own civilians.


With the EU potentially reconsidering its nearly unconditional commitment to the Iran deal due to internal politics, Iran may have to think twice about how much violence it deploys.  On the other hand, with the United States out of the picture diplomatically, Iran could make the calculation that any negative attention it gets from the unrest outweighs losing power since American economic support or diplomacy is an impossibility.


Whatever choice it makes, it is fairly safe to assess the situation in Iran as deeply unstable, and as a result the government will be desperate to get the economy

Economy, Geopolitics

The Lebanese people have taken to the street since October 17 to protest the country’s current economic disparity and the government’s mismanagement and corruption.  What started as a protest against increased taxes on products and services ranging from tobacco to WhatsApp calls has devolved into a collective indictment against the Lebanese ruling class.


On 29 October Prime Minister Saad Hariri announced his resignation in an attempt to assuage the civilian uproar.  While the resignation temporarily cooled tensions, protests have reignited and citizens have demanded more reforms including some protesters calling for the entire political system and all government officials and politicians to be replaced.


In contrast to previous protests and revolutions, this unrest is not divided on sectarian or political party lines.  Rather, a mass grassroots uprising has formed to fight against the inadequacy and corruption of the Lebanese political class.


While the protestors’ demands are broad, dissatisfaction with government economic policy and deep-seated corruption have been consistent throughout the duration of the ongoing street protests.


Economy and Corruption


Lebanon’s economy has tanked and currently sits at 0% growth, precipitating a wide-reaching economic crisis.  Protesters have accused the government of stealing money from the Lebanese people and creating a pervasively corrupt economy.  This has caused a litany of problems for both the Lebanese economy and its people.


In the country’s second-largest city, Tripoli, unemployment has been estimated at 50%, and many citizens feel they have no future economic prospects.  Economic uncertainty and poverty have clearly deepened the distrust and anger with the government.


As to how the economy has got so bad, according to protesters, there are multiple answers and mistakes the government has made in recent years. 


One of the loudest critiques of the government has been corruption, which not only has taken money out of the hands of the average Lebanese household, but it has also frozen foreign investment into the country, only worsening the already woeful economic conditions for many Lebanese people.


Lebanon’s President Michel Aoun has been attempting to position himself as the solution to corruption within the country, and he had thousands of supporters in the streets trying to spread his message.  However, anti-government protests in the following days have roundly rejected Aoun’s overtures and outnumbered his supporters.


Without investment, Lebanon’s economic woes will only worsen as its massive debt piles up and threatens an even bigger economic and political crisis. 


Foreign Relations


Before protestors took to the street en-masse, former Prime Minister Hariri had been exploring options to increase foreign investment, specifically from the United Arab Emirates.  Hariri visited the UAE to plead for a cash injection into Lebanon’s debt-ridden economy, and the UAE agreed to lift a travel ban on its citizens to Lebanon.


While Saudi Arabia and Western allies of Lebanon have made fewer public announcements about the ongoing developments, UAE announced they are still mulling over projects that were proposed nearly a month ago in their meetings with Hariri.


However, protestor’s dissatisfaction is only mounting and outside help from UAE can only go so far.  The UAE and other foreign investors are also unlikely to invest heavily or relieve the economic problems if the uncertainty around the political future of Lebanon is not resolved.


Perhaps even more important than potential future UAE investment, the White House announced the United States would freeze military aid to Lebanon and hold out nearly $105 million from the Lebanese Armed Forces.  The shortfall could potentially impact the reaction of the Lebanese government to protestors on the streets and puts President Aoun in a difficult spot to form a new government.


Historically, the United States has supported the Lebanese Armed Forces as a vehicle to fight the Iranian-backed political party Hezbollah.  Many voices in the United States Congress, State Department, and security apparatus have condemned the move.


While it is difficult to read the current erratic intentions of American foreign policy, many other states in the region will likely be looking at Lebanon with bated breath.  Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Israel, and more all have great interests in the small country and could potentially try to interfere in the country’s future political alignment if protests persist.


Political Future


While Lebanon’s political future is unstable and uncertain, changes are surely coming.  The country’s current economic situation and political alignment are clearly untenable.


With infrastructure crumbling, the Lebanese pound falling, and unemployment, inequality and unrest exploding, street protests will continue until the material conditions change.


Whether that takes the form of a civilian-led political revolution, technocratic policy changes, or brutal repression remains to be seen.  In the meantime, the Lebanese people will keep searching for answers and perhaps look to take matters into their own hands.


Until corruption within the country is tackled and the needs of protestors are met, foreign investment is unlikely to flow into the embattled nation.


Economy, Geopolitics

On the first day of October, thousands of Iraqis began taking to the streets to protest high unemployment numbers, corruption, poor public services, and an anaemic economy.  Iraqi security forces disbanded initial protests, but citizens began coming out in bigger numbers.  In response, the Iraqi government reacted with deadly force and brutally crushed the resurgent protests


From October 1st to October 6th, 108 protesters were killed and thousands more were injured at the hands of Iraqi security forces according to the Iraq Human Rights Commission.


It made a difficult anniversary for Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi who assumed his office in October 2018.  In addition to killing over 100 protesters, Abdul-Mahdi also announced a series of assistance packages for low-income residents to stem the tide of protesters.


The government also cut off internet access to limit protest organisation and any further uprisings, a move highly criticised by the UN for convening international human rights law.


For now, the protests have dissipated, in large part thanks to a repressive response by the Iraqi government.  But, if the protesters’ cries go unanswered, the government will soon face similar push back.


Source of Protests


The protests in Iraq originate from Iraqis’ discontent with the government’s economic policies which have marginalised the poorest  citizens.  While Iraq enjoys the fourth largest oil reserve in the world, many Iraqis have not seen that wealth trickle down to them and are expressing their anger at that fact.  


According to the World Bank, unemployment has only decreased by 1% in the last decade, and youth unemployment remains at a staggering 16%.  Female unemployment has also ballooned to 12%,  signaling a deepening economic divide between men and women.


While Iraq’s neighbours are looking to diversify their economy to meet with new demands and the inevitable decline of oil, Iraq is pumping out more than ever, over 4.6 million barrels per day.  Despite the increased production, forecasts predict the Iraqi economy will have a dip in annual GDP growth over the next several years.


These combined factors spell a difficult future for Abdul-Mahdi’s government and the unemployed and impoverished Iraqis demanding change.  While the current protests have been beaten back violently, an economic downturn will enlarge the fervour and protest numbers.


After violent suppression, Abdul-Mahdi told his countrymen and women on state television, “I will go and meet them without weapons and sit with them for hours to listen to their demands.”


While the protesters’ demands have been quite clear, it is unlikely that Abdul-Mahdi will be able to meet them without radically restructuring Iraq’s economy to favour the Iraqi people over oil company profits.


Economic Model


Since the US-led coalition invaded Iraq 16 years ago, the country has been ravaged and transformed.  One constant is the country’s dependence on oil, Iraq’s only noteworthy activity in the international economy over the past decades.


Before the 2003 invasion, Iraq suffered economic ups and downs associated with political events, oil price, periods of strict austerity and heavy lending.  But, after the invasionIraq shifted economic models from that of brutal dictator Saddam Hussein who let public spending flow to curry support from the public and politically insulate himself and build his power base.


Instead of the public spending and personal corruption of Saddam Hussein, Iraq has since carried out a more American neoliberal oil-dependent economy, one which lines the pockets of Western-backed oil elites and cuts public spending, allowing the free market to control Iraq’s economy.


As current Prime Minister Abdul-Mahdi has found this is becoming a tougher sell as many Iraqis continue to wallow in joblessness and economic despair while their country’s most valuable asset is being sold on the world market at a historical rate.


Future Implications for Iraq and the Region


The Middle East’s most powerful regional actor, Saudi Arabia has long been wary about regional unrest in its backyard.  Political conflict and calls for economic reform from angry protesters do not help the politically powerful hold on to their power.


But, Saudi Arabia’s opinion on unrest in Iraq largely depends on how hawkish they decide to play mounting tensions with Iran.  Some within Saudi Arabia view Iraq as intensely pro-Iran, and if relations with Iran worsen Saudi Arabia may stand to gain from destabilising a perceived Iranian ally in the form of Iraq.


Recent reports do indicate that Saudi Arabia is looking to cool tensions with Iran, making an aggressive role in Iraq unfeasible for the Crown Prince.  Instead, Iraq could play a pivotal role in thawing relations between the two regional powers, and the oil-dependent region might stand to gain from a ratcheting down of tension between the two.


In the case of increased Saudi-Iranian relations, once again the policy of stability over all else may dictate more brutal reactions to civilian uprisings.  Unfortunately for the Iraqi government and its citizens, when governments opt for the repressive route it usually increases bloodshed and while it may equal short-term economic stability, it’s often at the sacrifice of the long-term future of the country and its population.



Iran heavily features in many conflicts between regional and world powers, and it is often central to the great political issues of the day.  While Iran may not be directly involved, other countries’ opinions and strategies toward the Shia country shape numerous geopolitical situations and conflicts across the globe.


From Sudan to Saudi freedom of press, EU-American relations, and even Brexit, different countries’ diplomatic strategies toward Iran have far-reaching impacts.  One often finds that triangulation on Iran strategy infiltrates far more political posturing and movement than purely news and events directly related to Iran.


Iran has long played an important role on the international stage and has been a major factor in domestic politics within world powers.  But, Iran’s outsized impact on world politics has only grown in recent years largely due to the United States decision under the Trump White House to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehension Plan of Action (JPCOA).


Regardless of one’s political persuasion or opinion on the Iran nuclear deal, the United States withdrawal from the treaty and subsequent implementation of sanctions signaled the reshuffling of power and strategy on the world stage.


This analysis will recap some of the latest developments surrounding this geopolitical reconfiguration and look at what impact it has had on Iran, the Middle East region, and the state of alliances across the globe.


The Strait of Hormuz


Tensions between Iran and America have only heated up in recent weeks and months.  The Strait of Hormuz has been a flashpoint and the international press has been extensively covering flare-ups between Iran and international shipping boats.


The United States has attempted to use these incidents as a pretext for a stronger military response to Iran, with varied success.  Recently, Australia announced it would become the third country along with the United Kingdom and Bahrain to contribute to an American-led mission to guard shipping lanes against Iranian attacks.


However, despite appeals from the American security and state apparatus, its European partners have expressed reluctance to jump aboard a military mission that many believe would further threaten the nuclear deal.  The United Kingdom has proven to be America’s most reliable Western partner in responding to Iran, however, this alliance may be a short-lived calculation by new Prime Minister Boris Johnson in an attempt to sweeten a potential trade deal with America post-Brexit.


The European Union has been one of the most vocal defenders of the Iran nuclear deal, and the United States change of heart under Donald Trump has strained ties between multiple historic alliances.


Impact of sanctions


The United States Treasury billed its re-imposition of sanctions on Iran after leaving the Iran nuclear as “the toughest U.S. sanctions ever imposed on Iran.”  Furthermore, the Treasury Department reiterated “the United States is engaged in a campaign of maximum financial pressure on the Iranian regime and intends to enforce aggressively these sanctions that have come back into effect.”


The contrast from the multilateral JPCOA is stark, and it has been controversial both internally within the United States and abroad amongst American partners and signatories to the deal.


But varying reports are emerging that contradict the United States’ loud and proud message that American sanctions are effectively crippling the Iranian economy and lessening the financial power of the top players in Iran.


Reuters recently reported that despite American sanctions dropping Iranian crude exports by 80%, Iran is still exporting a strong $500 million a month in oil products.  In fact, Iran’s fuel exports have immensely grown since 2015.


However, Iran dumping more exports on the market does not necessarily point to a strong and healthy economy.  In 2015, the Iranian GDP grew over 12% largely in response to the landmark JPCOA.  However, the Iranian economy has been contracting ever since the United States pulled out of the treaty.


Due to the design of the sanctions, the average Iranian feeling a hit to their pocketbook with the annual household income decreasing.  The recent data uncovered by Reuters indicates that Iranian oil is still flowing into the market, but the Iran government seem to be the benefactors instead of the average family.  Whether this leads to mass political unrest that would truly impact the Iranian elite remains to be seen.


Regional conflict


Nowhere is Iran’s geopolitical position more strongly felt on foreign soil than in Yemen.  The country’s protracted civil war is effectively a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the Middle East’s most important rivalry.


Both countries have shown no indication they intend to pull out of the conflict or look for peaceful resolutions with Saudi Arabia announcing it will increase its troop levels in southern Yemen.


Many have pointed to Trump’s decision to leave the JPCOA as the nail in the coffin that allowed Saudi Arabia to become much more emboldened and aggressive toward Iran and deepened the crisis in Yemen. 


Combined with the Syrian Civil War, Iran and Saudi Arabia’s political and religious differences have caused instability and bloodshed across the region.  America’s turn away from diplomacy in favor of hawkish policy has shifted the dynamic enough to deepen differences and allow for a revving up of tensions.


The world stage


Internationally, Iran has become one of the issues of the day in more countries in a much more visible manner.  Politicians have had to regularly discuss their Iran strategy and Iran has remained in the news cycle more than any other Middle Eastern country in the last several years.


One of the most important changes in this timeframe has been the fracture between the United States and the European Union when it comes to strategy on Iran.  While the United States has cozied up to Saudi Arabia and remained tense with Russia and China, its relation to the European Union has been remarkably different ever since President Trump assumed office.


Arguably, President Emmanuel Macron is now the most important state leader within the European Union, and in the eyes of many, the French president has assumed the role of unofficial figurehead for the union.  Macron favors multilateralism, but his brand of politics has seemingly fallen out of favor on the world stage in terms of the impact it has had.


France reportedly offered Iran a $15 billion bailout to compensate lost oil sales from American sanctions, and in return, Iran would once again comply with the JPCOA.  However, an Iranian bailout is unlikely to go down well in France considering Macron’s own struggles with internal unrest.


And such a bailout would only be temporary, with the European Union still in dire need of a change in American policy toward Iran in order to find a lasting solution.  Unfortunately for Macron and the EU, Iranian President Rouhani recently ruled out bilateral discussions with the United States.


While the European Union and signatories to the JPCOA search for solutions, any sort of diplomatic solution to rising tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia and reducing violence in the Middle East is at the whim of an increasingly erratic American foreign policy.



Sudan has been in political upheaval since late December 2018 when thousands took to the streets to the protest increasing cost of living and a woeful economy.  The protests continued and picked up steam resulting in President Omar al-Bashir being ousted by the military in April.


Pro-democracy protesters are now flooding the streets to demand the ruling Transitional Military Council (TMC) hand over power to a civilian group.  The protestors are continuing their calls for democracy in the face inhumane repression from the TMC including a brutal crackdown dubbed the Khartoum Massacre on June 3rd when TMC forces massacred 128 people and raped 70.


The military’s misdeeds have not stopped despite international condemnation, and on July 29th TMC forces killed four high school students and an adult participating in a peaceful demonstration.  In response, the military closed schools indefinitely.


The European Union has repeatedly called on the Sudanese government to cede power to a civilian group, and the United States has made similar statements.  However, America’s regional allies and geopolitical games much larger than Sudanese internal politics have impeded the democratic demands of the Sudanese people.


 Saudi Arabia


Saudi Arabia is a key player in Sudanese politics, and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman has enjoyed robust support from American President Donald Trump.  Saudi Arabia plays an important role in Sudan due to its economic investment into the country and repeated intervention into the country’s economy and politics.


Sudan’s latest political revolution is a call back to the Arab Spring, a political movement across the Middle East which struck fear in many Arab world elites.  Saudi Arabia prefers its sphere of influence to be stable, in order to keep business flowing and lessen inspiration for any political revolutions in their own country.


In fact, Saudi Arabia has said as much.  The Saudi Press Agency made an official statement after the Khartoum Massacre in June that said, “The Kingdom hopes that all parties in Sudan will choose wisdom and constructive dialogue to preserve security and stability in Sudan, protect the people of Sudan from all harm, while maintaining Sudan’s interests and unity.”


Russia also made ambiguous comments, but they seemed to place more blame at the feet of protestors.  Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov said, “naturally, in order to do that, you need for order to be imposed, and you need to fight against extremists and provocateurs who don’t want the stabilization of the situation,”


Rather than forcefully condemning the military the Saudis focused on “all parties”.  This was the Saudi’s response in large part due to their proximity to the TMC.  Similarly to Saudi Arabia, Russia also prefers stability in the region over any democratic regime change.


Cooperation on Iran


As with many current regional concerns, the geopolitical games trace back to America and Saudi Arabia’s combined anti-Iran strategy.


Saudi Arabia and Mohammed Bin Salman have been in constant contact with the transitional military government ever since al-Bashir was overthrown.  In this time, Sudan has recommitted to fighting Iran with Saudi Arabia and maintains forces in the Yemen war in support of Saudi Arabia.


“Sudan is standing with the kingdom against all threats and attacks from Iran and Houthi militias,” Sudanese General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo said during a meeting with Saudi diplomats.


The United States also plays a pivotal role in the excessive force used by the Sudanese military against protestors. Shortly before the June massacre, US Congress blocked President Trump’s plans to sell munitions to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.  However, plans were shortly leaked on how the President could get billions of dollars of arms to Saudi Arabia and its allies.


Saudi Arabia is a crucial military ally to Sudan and the TMC is heavily funded and armed by the Saudi government.  This arms pipeline ties the American government to the TMC, and Saudi Arabia has regularly propped up the transitional Sudanese government with cash injections to increase their stability and power.


Protestors to Foreign Influence: “Stay Away”


For their part, Sudanese protestors and civilian groups are on top of the impact that many Middle Eastern countries have on their internal politics.  Already in April, protestors were recorded chanting in the streets urging Saudi Arabia and the UAE to “please keep your money” a day after the governments sent Sudan a $3 billion aid package.


The protestor’s suspicions are well-warranted considering the Saudis’ crushing response to protest movements in neighbouring countries during the Arab Spring.


Egypt and the African Union have also played an important role and drawn the ire of protestors for extending the transitional deadline at the behest of strongman Egyptian President el-Sisi.


As Sudanese protesters and civil society build distrust for foreign intervention, more needs to be done to ensure that actors with ulterior motives are limited in their impact on the future of Sudanese political and civil life.


The European Union has made strong comments, but more needs to be done to hold the United States to account for their abetting strategy of Saudi Arabia.  Unfortunately for the Sudanese, they seem to be caught in the crosshairs of a hawkish anti-Iran strategy that is spilling out all across the globe and further destabilizing countries such as Sudan.


Recent Constitutional Declaration


Despite the odds against the pro-democracy movement, the Sudanese people did achieve a huge victory on August 4 when the TMC agreed to a constitutional declaration with the opposition coalition which will form a three-year transitional government.


The former power of former leader al-Bashir still has deep roots in the country’s political system, and the military will still get to decide the minister of defence and interior.  But it is viewed as a positive step in the drawn-out battle for democracy.


Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the military will change its foreign policy strategy, and Sudan will likely still rely on contributions from their allies including Saudi Arabia and Egypt.  And despite the positive moves, the pro-democracy protestors and the international community will still have to keep an eye on proceedings to assure that the military does not cross the line once again.



Libya has been locked in a civil war since 2014 leaving the country in turmoil and regional partners scrambling for power in the fragile nation.  Fighting has ramped up in 2019, and General Khalifa Haftar’s anti-government LNA forces began an aggressive offensive against the Libyan government in April.


Haftar’s forces are sieging Tripoli, where the government led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj is based.  Haftar is not popular in the West due to his aggressive tactics, but he is backed by the UAE and Egypt, and he enjoys tepid support from some Western powers.  Haftar also met with Mohammed bin Salman in the Saudi capital shortly before launching the offensive on Tripoli.


With Russia attempting to play multiple sides and the United States offering a muddled policy on the conflict, Turkey and Qatar have emerged as the main actors fighting against Haftar and both have provided resources to militias fighting the LNA.  The United Nations is the biggest player in support of the interim government.


With the UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia on one side and Turkey and Qatar on the other, Libya could devolve into a proxy war on a scale similar to Syria or Yemen.  If other global and regional powers do not step up to deescalate the violence, Libyans will continue to suffer at the hands of military force from within and outside of the country.


Migrant Centre Attack and European Migrant Deal


On July 3, a migrant detention centre in Tripoli was hit by an air strike resulting in over 60 deaths and more than 100 injuries.  Most of the migrants were Africans in route to Europe but caught and detained by Libyan forces.


The United Nations forcefully condemned the attack and the UN-backed GNA, led by Sarraj, accused Haftar of being behind the air strikes with help from the UAE.  The government alleged a UAE fighter jet made in the United States carried out the deadly attack.


The European Union struck a deal with Libyan authorities in 2017 to stem the flow of migrants into Europe, but the UN and other political organizations have come out against the EU’s policy.  Reports have linked the EU-Libya migration deal with migrants being traded on open slave markets and many migrants living in appalling and inhumane conditions.


The latest attack will put further pressure on European governments to take a concrete position on the Libyan Civil War and deescalate tensions in the region.  If it wants to save the controversial migrant deal then the Union may have to do more than stay on the sidelines when it comes to Libya.


The European Union has struggled to develop a united front on Libya due to France’s mild support for Haftar in contrast to other European nations.  When the LNA offensive began in April, France blocked an EU statement calling for Haftar to halt the military offensive.


President Emmanuel Macron, quite similar to American President Donald Trump, sees Haftar as an ally in fighting Islamic extremism in Northern Africa, despite Haftar’s recent overtures to religious elements at the behest of the Saudi government.  France’s position cripples any European Union play at peacekeeping, and locks the Europeans out of a seat at the table.


The tension between southern European countries fervent support of the Libya migrant deal and Macron’s focus on Islamic extremism is a major flashpoint when the European Union discusses Libya.


One would expect Haftar to be under increased pressure after his forces were accused of committing the attack.  However, survivors of the migrant centre attack have reported they can still hear air attacks and fear for their lives.


Before the offensive on Tripoli, one of Haftar’s key allies, Egypt, was looking at alternative solutions including supporting the government.  But, Haftar’s offensive forced Egypt’s hand to double down its commitment to the LNA.  If Haftar’s forces are connected to the attack then Egypt may be forced to reconsider its position once again.


Proxy War?


The United Nations is the biggest international actor supporting the interim government of Prime Minister Sarraj.  The United States has wavered in its position, Russia has been talking with all sides, and the European Union has failed to provide a united front.


In turn, this has led to countries in the region with hardened stances having the greatest role in the continuation of the war.  Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia all have economic and political interests in Haftar seizing more control of Libya.


However, with the interim government holding out in Tripoli, neither side looks to be the outright winner in this conflict any time soon.  Instead, the fighting is at risk of turning into a protracted proxy war that will devastate the Libyan people and further destabilize the region.


Without a firm position calling for a ceasefire, the conflict will wage on and increase in its bloodiness.  Rather than concern itself with resolving the conflict, the international community is divided on the issue and fighting over political and economic control of the war-torn region.


Growing tensions between Washington and Tehran appeared to reach a head last week, following suspected attacks against two oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman on Thursday 13th June, the blame for which US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has placed squarely with Iran.

The suspected attacks come amidst rising geopolitical tensions as the US seeks to strangle Iranian oil exports in a bid to pressurise Iran to desist from uranium enrichment and curb Tehran’s regional ambitions across the Middle East. Iran, for its part appears to be playing with fire, aiming to foment instability in global oil markets in order to pressurise Trump to ease the sanctions crippling the Iranian economy at risk of provoking a wider conflagration.

This latest crisis comes after President Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme in May 2018, a move followed by the Administration’s designation of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps as a proscribed terrorist organisation this April. In response to Washington’s ‘maximum pressure’ strategy, Tehran stands accused of sponsoring a series of attacks against tankers near the Emirati port of Fujairah last month, creating a situation which may be likened to that of a tinderbox awaiting a spark.

Despite ominous comparisons to the 2003 Iraq War amidst bellicose rhetoric from both sides, the hard fact remains that a violent conflagration would almost certainly serve neither sides’ strategic interests. In recognition of this, recent statements from both Trump and Rouhani shy away from the prospect of open hostilities. Whether conflict can be averted though fundamentally hinges on whether both leaders can resist pressure from hardliners in Washington and Tehran as well as each side avoiding dangerous misperceptions of the others’ intentions which could inadvertently drag the US and Iran into unwanted confrontation.

Washington’s Dilemma

America’s posture towards the Iran has been extensively criticised as being wildly inconsistent, with Washington blowing hot and cold towards Tehran. Despite President Trump’s decision to tear up the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, arguably a knee jerk response driven by his pressing need to undo any legacy of the Obama Administration, the executive has vacillated between aggressive posturing and appeasement. One might argue Trump is seeking to repeat his successful rapprochement with North Korea in 2017, taking a carrot-and-stick approach to bring Tehran to the negotiating table on his terms.

But Iran is not North Korea. Tehran is a formidable foe with a large, highly motivated military, difficult terrain and no shortage of allies on the international stage. Given the immense military, political and economic strains the ‘forever wars’ in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed on the US with little to show for the effort, it is highly unlikely Washington desires a rinse and repeat against a far more implacable foe.

This is not to mention the profound ramifications even a limited conflict would have on global markets, with conservative estimates suggesting oil prices could shoot to $250 per barrel in such an event, as well as the increased geopolitical instability across the region such a showdown would likely precipitate.

Though Trump may not want war, the hawkish advisors he’s surrounded himself with have less reservations. In the White House Secretary of State Mike Pompeo as National Security Advisor John Bolton have adopted a ‘maximum pressure’ strategy towards Iran centred on a sanctions regime aimed to bring Iranian oil revenues ‘to zero’. Both individuals have a long history of supporting regime change in the Middle East, with Bolton in particular playing a key role in the decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Simultaneously, both see a hardline on Iran as crucial to discredit the Democrats, who argue Obama’s olive branch to Tehran was paying dividends, in the run-up to the 2020 elections.

Tehran’s Dilemma

For Iran, of course, outright confrontation would likely be disastrous, and Tehran knows it. This, however, does not remove the immense internal and external pressures driving the regime towards open conflict.

On one level, the Iranian economy is clearly buckling under the weight of sanctions, especially after Trump announced the suspension of sanction exemptions to major importers of Iranian oil, such as China, India and Japan in April. Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia has increased its oil output to sell to former buyers of Iranian oil, thus increasing resentment against Tehran’s major regional rival. Subjected to such pressures, it is perhaps no surprise that Iran has opted its confrontational stance, judging that it has nothing to lose when economic warfare is as damaging to Iran as actual warfare.

In fact, Iran’s latest actions in the Persian Gulf – if it was indeed Tehran that carried out the attacks, are highly calculated, seeking to demonstrate the vulnerability of one of the world’s most important strategic choke points to Iranian pressure. Moreover, the regime may seek to drive a wedge between the US and its allies, pressurising the Europeans and Japanese to encourage Washington to ease sanctions.

Tehran, however, is playing a dangerous game. Much as in Washington, hardliners aligned with the IRGC seek to bolster their appeal ahead of next year’s parliamentary elections, pressurising previously moderate politicians such as President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif who agreed to unilaterally stand by the JCPOA despite Trump’s withdrawal to demonstrate their anti-American credentials for domestic purposes. This suggests that Iran is at a crossroads, raising fears of a fundamental power shift from the moderates to the hardliners in Tehran – a power shift that may just tip the ongoing proxy conflict towards open confrontation.

The idea that America and Iran are set on a collision course is a fallacy. Open conflict in the Persian Gulf can be averted – whether it is or not depends whether prudence or hot headedness prevails – both in Washington and Tehran.

-Written by William Marshall for Pegasus Strategic Advisory Ltd.



Economy, Geopolitics

The European Parliament elections which wrapped up on 26 May are not the end all be all when it comes to the European Union, but the election results show voting populations and member states are politically fragmented.  Balancing 28-member state interests means that the transnational political body does not always have a unified position on complex geopolitical issues. 


With this said, the Union still has an important role in the international community and many European actors want to have an impact on the issues of the day.  So, this piece will analyse what role the European Union and key member states are playing in growing tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and how effective it is in achieving its goals.




The United States has played a pivotal role in ramping up international tensions between the two regional powers.  President Trump’s administration has cozied up to Saudi Arabia and taken an antagonistic stance towards Iran to the delight of their Saudi allies. 


Most recently, the White House accused Iran of sabotaging four tankers off the coast of the UAE.  Two of the ships were Saudi, but no hard evidence has been produced to link Iran to the damage.  US national security adviser John Bolton repeated these claims without evidence on 30 May in Abu Dhabi, adding an accusation that Iran is responsible for a recent failed attack on Saudi Arabia’s port city, Yanbu.


Trump’s decision to leave the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the nuclear non-proliferation agreement between Iran and the world’s nuclear powers, also plays a large role in the current situation, and it placed the European Union in an awkward position.


European Union’s Growing Role


After the United States decided to renege on the Iran deal, many anticipated the European Union to play a balancing role to the hard-American stance on Iran.  European leaders have repeatedly expressed their commitment to the deal and have taken a more neutral stance to Iran-Saudi tensions.


The ascendance of a hawkish American policy toward Iran has placed the European Union in a difficult position, one in which Europe is often playing the role of contradicting US policy, despite their supposed alliance with the Americans.  Europe’s position is much less extreme, and it has been accused of being drowned out by the forceful words of the Americans.


Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif stated in early May that the EU had been bullied by America, and the Europeans had failed to speak forcefully against the US for breaking the nuclear deal and slapping more sanctions on Iran.  Several days before Zarif’s statement, EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini and the foreign ministers of Germany, France, and the UK released a joint statement reading, “we… take note with regret and concern of the decision by the United States not to extend waivers with regards to trade in oil with Iran. We also note with concern the decision by the United States not to fully renew waivers for nuclear non-proliferation projects in the framework of the JCPoA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action).”


Iran and Zarif were disappointed that all the EU was offering was “regret and concern” instead of more forcefully rejecting the United States’ breaking of the deal.  In response, Iran made several ultimatums and said they would stop abiding by several commitments due to the United States’ re-imposition of sanctions.


The EU issued a similar statement expressing concern about Iran’s commitment to the nuclear deal and rejecting any ultimatums made by Iran.


With Saudi Arabia and the United States on one side and Iran on the other, both sides are attempting to make the European Union choose a side.  But Europe has so far tried to remain neutral, a position made more difficult as the positions harden.


War in Iran?


President Trump, flanked by hawkish advisers, has made a variety of statements hinting at war with Iran in the hopes of effecting regime change.  Saudi Arabia has likewise issued hard words to this end, signifying a unified American-Saudi front.


So far, the European Union has rejected any notion of a threat from Iran and British Major General Chris Ghika broke from the American line that Iran is a danger and said, “no, there has been no increased threat from Iranian-backed forces in Iraq or Syria.”


Ghika’s words are particularly notable as he is the deputy commander of an American-led coalition fighting the Islamic State.


American Secretary of State Mike Pompeo once again failed to curry favour for a more confrontational stance from the EU toward Iran during a mid-May meeting in Brussels.  Instead, Mogherini urged Pompeo to take a cautious approach to Iran, “we are living in crucial delicate moments where the most responsible attitude to take and should be is maximum restraint and avoiding any escalation on the military side.”


An all-out war in Iran or any intervention to facilitate regime change does not have the support of the European Union, and for now, it appears that the United States has failed to generate support for such actions at home or abroad.  But, the European Union’s more neutral stance on the Saudi Arabian-Iranian tensions will always face challenges as long as the United States strongly supports the Saudi Arabian stance.


Without taking a forceful position in support of Iran or against the United States and Saudi Arabia, the European Union runs the risk of being side lined in favour of more aggressive actors.  The European Union’s ‘neutral’ stance is also compromised by continued arms shipments to Saudi Arabia, a development left unchecked that undermines Europe’s commitment to peaceful resolutions and conflict prevention.


Economy, Geopolitics

President Donald Trump announced plans to end exemptions from sanctions for countries purchasing oil from Iran.  The sudden announcement will have broad impacts on the world economy and international relations, some more hidden than others.


The White House’s staunch opposition to Iran comes as no surprise considering Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Advisor John Bolton are both notoriously hawkish towards Iran.  This latest move shows that the White House is showing no sign of rapprochement with Iran and will continue their antagonistic stance which has further hardened recently.


Early in April, President Trump designated Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a foreign terrorist group.  Iran responded in turn by declaring the United States military is a terrorist organization.


The end to exemptions from sanctions is an attempt from the United States to drive Iranian oil exports to zero.  Iran is already feeling the pressure from previous sanctions and an end to its oil exports would be disastrous.  The IMF has reported that Iran is tumbling into an economic recession, and the most recent numbers show inflation at 40 percent and a forecasted 6 percent reduction in the Iranian economy in the upcoming year.


But more than just affecting America’s bilateral relations with Iran and Iran’s economy, the announcement threatens sanctions to valuable trade partners and economic powers such as India, China, South Korea, and Turkey.  It also has far-reaching implications on Middle Eastern politics.




Turkey could be particularly hard hit by this decision as President Erdoğan has increasingly pivoted toward Iran as a trade partner as tensions have soured with Saudi Arabia and other regional partners.


An economic downturn now would come at a particularly inopportune time for Erdoğan considering his party AKP’s unexpected defeats during recent local elections.  Voters in Istanbul and Ankara both voted for opposition party CHP to take over the mayoral office in a stark rebuke to Erdogan, former mayor of Istanbul.  Turkish voters have been animated by economic disparity in the country, so the ruling political elites are vulnerable in the event of an oil crash.


Next to Iraq, Turkey is one of the countries with the greatest reliance on Iranian oil, despite ratcheting down oil imports from Turkey over the last two years in expectation of America’s hardened stance toward Iran.  However, Turkey’s foreign ministry announced that their trade ministry would be working with Iran to circumvent any new American sanctions to keep up oil trade between the two partners.


Simultaneously, the Turkish foreign ministry is working to convince the White House that the sanctions are bad for business.  But Turkey and the United States seem to be growing apart as Turkey continues to work with Iran and increases its ties to Russia.




Iran is Iraq’s most important regional trade partner, and Iraq is heavily reliant on Iran for oil amongst other energy sources. 


Iraq’s Prime Minister Abdul Mehdi made a statement on the tensions between America and Iran and said, “we are going to deploy all our efforts to ease and calm down the situation.  It is not in the interest of any of the parties engaged.”


The United States still has around 5,000 active duty troops in Iraq despite factions within the Iraqi government asking for the American troops to leave.  President Trump has stated his policy on American troops is to keep them in Iraq to keep an eye on Iran.


But the Iraqi government may be pushed into a corner if America continues its hard line stance on one of its most valuable partners, Iran.  Harming Iran could cripple Iraq’s economy, and it has already begun to look for other great powers outside of the US.


Russia and Iraq held high-level bilateral meetings at a two-day conference and came to 16 agreements.  One of the highlights of the meeting was Russian-Iraqi trade in oil and gas.  Russian energy giant Lukoil is heavily investing in the Iraqi economy, and Lukoil’s president met with Prime Minister Abdul Mehdi in late March.


Both Iraq and Russia committed to deepening ties between the two states during the meetings, and developments in their relationship indicate that Iraq is turning away from America into the hands of Russia as a direct result of America’s anti-Iran stance.


Oil Prices


Outside of foreign relations, the latest anti-Iran move is expected to cost Americans at the gasoline pump.  If prices hike significantly during the summer months, the Trump administration may face the brunt of anti-motorist sentiment.


Americans are particularly sensitive about their gas prices, and President Trump often appears to be very sensitive to his supporter’s perception of him.  If his Fox News allies turn on him due to rising gas prices then he could decide to change course on a whim.


President Trump has indicated that Saudi Arabia and the UAE will pick up production to cover for the loss of Iranian oil to the global market.  However, neither state has committed to a plan to pick up their production.


Unfortunately, American foreign policy is quite unpredictable in the age of Trump, however, his foreign policy confidants have been steadfast in their opposition to Iran.  If one was taking bets, you would expect the Trump administration to remain firm in their position toward Iran despite potential backlash from the public.