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Geopolitics

In April of this year Saudi Arabia and France agreed on military cooperation aimed at increasing capacities within the kingdom.  This move will reduce the kingdom’s direct reliance on US military support and is in line with its efforts to improve economic, political, and economic resilience in future years.

The kingdom of Saudi Arabia is facing a multitude of strategic challenges that Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman is seeking to address coherently under his Vision 2030 for the future of the country. The US will need to show stronger diplomatic support for Saudi Arabia to remain a trustworthy partner, as the recent efforts to increase domestic military capacity are also a sign that the Saudi allegiance to the US might be wavering.

The strategy underlying Vision 2030

Vision 2030 stipulates that Saudi Arabia will fundamentally reform its economy to move away from over-reliance on oil revenue. Hence, Aramco, the giant Saudi state-owned oil company is meant to become a more diversified company seeking to play a major role in industrial policy of the country.

In this vein, Muhammad bin Salman has announced that the Kingdom will look to become a more diversified investment powerhouse using its public investment fund. Further, it is planned for the country to play a key role in international trade due to its valuable strategic positioning at the intersection of three continents.

In addition, the Crown Prince plans to put a major focus on increasing employment opportunities within the Kingdom, in a society that has exceptionally low labour market participation and a very young population. These two factors are believed to have majorly contributed to the public discontent sparking the Arab Spring.

This set of reforms can be understood as Bismarckian politics, aimed at ensuring the security and ongoing prosperity of the Kingdom in the face of a young and growingly demanding population, with the shadow of the Arab Spring still very present in the minds of key decision makers. Hence, the drive to improve conditions and opportunities for the population is meant to legitimise the ruling class and social reforms are enacted from above to reduce pressure from below.

The move to diversify the economy is long overdue, and is particularly timely, as oil prices become increasing volatile and its future demand weakening rapidly. This represents not only an economic challenge, but also a diplomatic one, as US interest in the region could conceivably decrease in line with the importance of oil.

Finally, the Kingdom has no interest in losing the race over supremacy in the region to Iran, which in the eyes of Saudi Arabia, has the potential to become an existential threat. The deal with Iran under the Obama administration has strained the relationship with the Saudis. The US used to clearly commit to the country’s supremacy in the region. When US-president Obama effectively suggested for Saudi Arabia to “share the region” with its religious and political arch nemesis Iran, he gave rise to concerns that the US might not be a reliable partner anymore.

Vision 2030 can therefore be seen as a wholesale strategy to increase the independence and security of the ruling class of Saudi Arabia from the potential dangers from within and without. Correspondingly, the turn to increase military production capacities within the country represents a key part of that strategy. The Saudi Military Industries Company (SAMI) that was set up in 2017, will be the vehicle to reduce reliance on outside support.

The US has significantly undermined its trust with the Saudis, as the agreement with Iran, as well as the lack of US support for former allies during the Arab Spring were clearly seen as indicators for the potential volatility of US allegiance to the Saudi family.

Yet, Saudi Arabia remains an integral partner for the US. As it is explicitly pointed out in the Vision 2030 statement, Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam and therefore carries massive weight in the ideological direction of the religion. As a result, Saudi Arabia is a key partner for the US in its efforts to curb Islamic Radicalism.

Further, the US has no interest in further conflict and will therefore be forced to abstain from policy that might destabilise the region. Further military cooperation is imperative to ensure diplomatic trust between the two countries. Yet, this will be connected to significant political costs domestically for the US. Nevertheless, key policy objectives of the US are tied to the survival of the present ruling class of Saudi Arabia as both revolution and the likely chaotic aftermath, as well as further escalation of military conflict would be much costlier.

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Economy, Geopolitics

How does a cat react when boxed-in and threatened with existential danger? In a classic “fight or flight” response, and when “flight” is not an option, the cat arches its spine for all-out might and fights back like a multi-headed demon. That’s what the tiny state of Qatar has been doing ever since its detractors boxed-it in—it conjured up a spine of steel and has been fighting back with all the energy and wherewithal it could muster. The outcome shows clearly that from the beginning of the blockade by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt a year ago , Qatar has been playing the hand it was dealt masterfully, outflanking one and all at every turn.

In fact, for a lesson on how to engender a multiplier effect from the sum-total of their resources, large corporations planning all-out public relations campaigns have a lot to learn from how Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani mobilized his country’s full cadre of top lieutenants and pointed everyone—including himself—in every possible game-impacting direction.

Moreover, despite the as yet unresolved Saudi-led boycott, the results have been astounding, be that in regard to Qatar’s current state of the economy, its citizenry’s morale and, arguably, the country’s standing among non-involved nations worldwide. Significantly, to help withstand the trade embargo, Qatar forged ahead with newly-found shipping routes via Oman and displayed its resolve and ability to step up—at warp speed—the development of various self-sufficiency agricultural and local production-type initiatives. The outcome? Qatar recently boasted that the current month of June 2018 will show a 50% increase in its merchandise trade surplus over that of the same month a year ago, and that business conditions in the private, non-oil sector continue to improve over the period just prior to the trade embargo.

Going back to the fateful Riyadh summit of May 2017, when President Trump lectured some 50 Arab leaders on the need to stop financing Jihadist movements, it was then evident that the Saudis and Emiratis had whispered effectively in his ear and gained his support at the expense of the “mischievous” Qataris. Trump bought the argument that Qatar was squarely in the Iranian camp, and that it was indeed a principal source of financing for Hamas and other extremist groups. Since then however, Qatar has made considerable strides in convincing those who can arbiter objectively that the Saudis and Emiratis perhaps had it in for them essentially because of the independent lifestyle of its people and their prevalent posture against tyrannical rule. In addition, Qatar argued—in many quarters convincingly—that the free-wheeling Al-Jazeera, their prime news agency, was the precise symbol that Qatar’s neighbors abhorred the most, and that all the other arguments, including Iran’s stake in their oil and gas industry, were but a smokescreen to hide those other core concerns. Be that as it may, public opinion seems to have shifted on the subject, with Qatar looking all the more judicious.

Furthermore, Qatar-skeptics need only view the current posturing of the American camp, with both Trump himself and Secretary of State Pompeo reversing course and working feverishly to finally find an amicable resolution to the impasse in the Gulf, their concern revolving primarily around not driving Qatar into the Russian camp. This became all the more urgent when Qatar recently threatened to sign on the dotted line for the purchase of S-400 surface-to-air missiles from Moscow. For months now, the Saudis have been objecting heatedly to the deal, with Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman—and King Salman himself—recently asking French President Macron to intervene in the matter. They even threatened to take military action against Qatar on the grounds that if their neighbor installed the air defense system, it would put the Kingdom’s security interests at risk.

This now-sweltering episode originated in October 2017. It followed a visit to Doha by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu that was aimed at bolstering ties between the two countries and, from the American-Saudi perspective, giving Moscow a significant foothold in the Gulf. However, whether the deal is ultimately consummated or not, it is a clear eye-opener as to Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim’s mindset of not sitting still while awaiting others to take action on his country’s behalf. When its back was shoved against the wall, Qatar chose to fight back, and although the final chapter has yet to be written, the tiny state seems to be holding its own, and then some.

 

 

 

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Geopolitics

Whether you’re a Trumpie, reveling in how President Trump keeps his promises, or a Never-Trumper, horrified at how he revels in dispensing chaos, you can’t but gawk at how he managed to reinvent himself over the past few weeks. In a frenzied sequence involving much “pulling”, he pulled the rug from under the three M’s (May, Macron, and Merkel), pulled the plug on the Iran nuclear deal, pulled the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and, with a bit of luck, might even pull off an implausible deal with the North Koreans. What he is apt to do next is, as usual, one of those things no betting man would want to wager on.

By enlisting Mike Pompeo as new Secretary of State, and John Bolton as new National Security Adviser, Trump has now bolstered his status as head of the most pugnacious three-headed behemoth of the post-Soviet Union era. With a scorching predilection for busting any status quo established by his predecessors—President Obama being the one who especially inflames his prickliness—the question is, what now for the landscape in the Middle East?

To affirm that Israel and the Saudis exulted when President Trump derailed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) would be a gross understatement. The beam on Netanyahu’s face was as wide as the Gaza strip, and the Saudis must have also fizzed with delight. The question nevertheless arose in regard to what Plan B there might be for Iran. Well, several observations can be factored in for a Plan B.

For a start, in the process of doing away with the nuclear deal, no one could have ignored the stern menace on Trump’s face. He spoke forcefully into the cameras and more than once warned Iran against reinstituting any new nuclear aspirations, threatening them with something akin to the B-2 bombers and other naval armadas he sent to the Korean peninsula at a time, only a few months back, when he was attempting to intimidate Kim Jong-un. It seems to have worked then, so why not with the Ayatollahs?

In addition, it took what seemed only seconds after Trump withdrew from the JCPOA that the Israelis sent fighter jets and bombers on dozens of anti-Iran missions in Syria. That must have set Iran back a notch or two and cost them a few pennies—with the unmistakable promise of much more to come.

Following the decimation of Iranian assets inside of Syria, another shoe dropped, this one barely noticeable. In siding decidedly with the Israelis, and assembling a mouthful of complaints against the Iranians, a US spokesperson stating that Iran had even put at risk American lives in the middle of—of all places—Riyadh. This concern, barefaced as it might seem, nevertheless was in reference to a couple of missiles that Iran-backed Houthi combatants had launched in the general direction of Riyadh.

What is at any rate in plain sight—and has been an essential ingredient of why Trump withdrew from the ill-fated, Obama-inspired, “worst deal in the history of mankind”—is the new “axis” between Trump, Israel, and Crown Prince Mohamad. All three are biting at the chomp to deal Iran additional punishment, come rain or sunshine.

As for France, Germany, and the UK, following the kissy-kissy love-fest between Macron and Trump, and having endured the embarrassment that followed Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, they now face the prospect of the US’s perpetual ratcheting up of sanctions against Iran. The “E3” are thus in the tough spot of having to choose between dealing with Iran and dealing with the US, with prospects of reviving a deal with Iran at best improbable.

At another yet parallel level, the new coalition of “friendly” Arab nations have exhibited nowhere near the same fervor as in the past towards Palestinian issues. Left with little incentive to come to any negotiating table, the Palestinians could well revert to more extremist relationships and behaviors. The only odd thing is that they have not yet embraced the Ayatollahs as benefactors, the Sunni-Shiite divide perhaps still proving stronger than their current predicament.

Finally, to confront the hugely confrontational US/Israeli/Saudi tripartite, the Middle East mosaic seems to be moving towards yet another axis, that involving Russia, Iran, and Turkey, with a prognosis advocating simply that there will be no shortage of action in that part of the world.

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Geopolitics

Anyone who’s spent time in an Arab country can relate to how conspiracy theories abound in that part of the world. In the past, Israel would invariably top the list of suspects every time the Palestinians got the short end of an event. In more recent times however, it’s Iran that has usurped that distinction, with Israel promptly construed to be behind any machination that negatively impacts Iran or its regional cohorts.

Today, Israel is busier than ever fighting off Iranian encroachments in Syria. It is also seen working zealously to confine the roles of Iran-backed Hezbollah and Hamas in Lebanon and Gaza respectively.

As for the US, President Trump’s choice of Saudi Arabia for his first stop on a maiden trip in May of 2017 had implications beyond the pomp and deference he was greeted with. With regard to Qatar though, it is reasonable to assume that when Trump lectured the congregation of some fifty Moslem leaders to put a stop to Arab financial aid going to Jihadists, Qatar’s isolation and blockade had already been baked into the cake.

Another piece of the puzzle is currently playing out. By May 12, President Trump will have to decide on whether to pull the plug on the nuclear agreement with Iran. With French President Macron currently on a state visit to the US, and with France and other European allies steeply engaged in selling tons of sophisticated products to Iran, the smart money is on Macron talking Trump into leaving the deal with Iran more or less intact.

On first blush, it would therefore seem that both the US and Israel at first went along schemes to isolate Qatar, their main objectives perhaps consisting of placating the Saudis and driving a wedge between one of the richest nations in the world and Iran.

Signs have emerged though that Qatar may of late have played its cards effectively, including a concerted public relations blitz that has boosted its standing, starting with the US. 

Qatar’s initial set of arguments had it that the Saudis and Emiratis always wanted to punish it because of its independence, the relative emancipation of its citizens, and its popular stance against tyrannical rule. Furthermore, Qatar claimed that free-wheeling Al-Jazeera, their prime news agency, is the precise symbol that Qatar’s neighbors fear the most. They assert that everything else, including Iran’s participation in their critical gas and oil industry, is nothing but a smokescreen that can easily be resolved, given good faith all around.

Nevertheless, that good faith has yet to emerge. In fact, the sniping and hurling of ugly propagandist claims, particularly between Qatar and its prime detractor in the United Arab Emirates, seem to continue on a cresting trajectory, thrown about copiously and with hardly any consideration for mediation.

Qatar’s PR campaign, unprecedented among Arab nations in both depth and sophistication, is giving reason to believe that Qatar has indeed turned the corner and is winning the diplomatic war with its feuding counterparts. Noteworthy in that regard is the US’s latest posture which, while calling for compromise, emphasizes strong support for Qatar.

It started with strategic talks during visits to the US by the Qatari Emir himself, Sheikh Tamim Ben Hamad Al Thani, and a plethora of visits by other prominent members of the Al Thani family, as well as cabinet ministers, and Qatari figures with significant links to industrial and aviation interests.

To cite a few examples, Qatar first reminded the US media of the importance of the ten thousand-strong Al-Udeid Air Base the US maintains in the near the Qatari capital of Doha. They tout that base as the “refueling station” for planes going to all of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, the latter as recently as a couple of weeks ago when the US and allied planes bombed chemical facilities there.

In a profusion of other bold moves, Qatar pledged investments in the US economy to the tune of $100bn, $10bn of which towards infrastructure projects dear to President Trump’s heart, and the doubling of Qatar’s participation in the Qatar-US Economic Forum’s $125bn partnership. In addition, Qatar’s all-out rallying of public opinion included military partnership with individual states in the US, and large missile deals with the Pentagon. There was additionally an impactful and repetitive Qatari outcry soliciting goodwill from Kuwait, Bahrain, Turkey, and other European players with influence in the Middle East.

There are thus signs, clearer by the day, that underscore Qatar’s effective campaign to rehabilitate itself as a valuable member of the of the fraternity of Gulf states. What is left now is for a few multinational players to line up behind current Kuwaiti efforts to keep the dispute on the forefront of negotiations for a resolution of the conflict that many claim has already caused more regional disruption than was ever called for.

 

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Geopolitics

British diplomat Martin Griffiths, the new UN Special Envoy for Yemen, carries a stack of mediation qualifications so deep that he is viewed as the best—and perhaps last—chance for a quick and sustainable resolution to the civil strife in Yemen.

However, what Mr. Griffiths has bought into is no ordinary conflict. The urgency of this UN effort derives from the failure of prior missions to bring an end to the thousand days of deadly factional fighting that has killed more than 10,000 people, maimed tens of thousands, displaced another two million, ignited a massive outbreak of cholera, and led to a still-surging hunger crisis—all of which being dubbed the worst man-made humanitarian disaster in modern history.

In addition, fuel was thrown over the flames recently when some faction, presumably the Houthis, shot ballistic missiles, presumably Iranian-made, at targets in Riyadh, presumably one or more royal palaces. The cynical viewpoint would thus have it that as a result, the Yemen that today greets Mr. Griffiths is being held together with duct tape.

What might nonetheless be helpful to the new envoy is the simmering public relations quandary that mostly Saudi Arabia—but also the U.S.—finds itself in. Detractors blame the Saudi air force for having dropped ton after ton of destruction from the air, as well as for the naval blockade that conjured massive “food insecurity”, a UN euphemism for spiraling food scarcity and food prices that people can hardly afford. The Yemeni riyal for example lost 50% of its value over only the last 12 months.

As for the U.S., congress there is getting restless with regards to America’s considerable role in the air campaign, providing critical midair refueling for Saudi and Emirati warplanes and, together with the UK and France—and perhaps Israel as well—assisting with intelligence and bomb targeting logistics. One might therefore infer that the pressure from across public opinion in the West could perhaps render Mr. Griffith’s task a little easier, if only because the Saudi-led coalition might be ready to relent, at least for the duration of Griffiths-led peace talks.

There are other conflicting paradigms that abound in that poorest of Arab nations, for what started in early 2015 as a falling-out between two well-defined nemeses has metastasized into a plethora of armed-to-the-teeth splinter groups—each with its own fledgling agenda.

To cite just the one example, one of the conflagrations involves the U.S.’s independent air strikes against Jihadist militants from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). These have evolved into al-Qaeda’s leftover yet best organized Jihadists in the world, operating brazenly out of Yemen’s forbidding terrain in the east, and conducting regular and brutal strikes against civilians and government forces in the south. Why is that prickly? Because U.S. ally Saudi Arabia is counting on those same Jihadists—and some say providing them with arms—to counter the separatist movement in Aden and other parts of the south which, by the way, happens to be supported by the United Arab Emirates, staunchest ally of the Saudis.

This is further exacerbated by a critical enmity that developed over the past few months between President Hadi and the UAE, forcing the Saudis to keep Hadi and his sons and key ministers under house arrest in Riyadh.

One likely outcome might thus involve this increasingly important separatist faction. Known as the Southern Transitional Council, their fighters, including remnants of ex-President Saleh loyalists, recently exchanged fierce shelling and shooting with government forces, proving they’re there to be reckoned with, and likely earning them a meaningful say in a prospective unification government.

In another predicable outcome, Iran and their Hezbollah cohorts may be amenable to pressuring the Houthis into enabling the resumption of peaceful distribution of food and other badly needed necessities throughout areas they control. This would doubtless be negotiated against another considerable representation in such a new government, much like Hezbollah parliamentarians did in Lebanon.

The first task that Mr. Griffiths faces however would have to consist of bringing about a ceasefire that can hold. As long as the cross-country duels remain the order of the day, and ballistic missiles keep getting hurled at Saudi territory, nothing else can be achieved.

Next would have to be getting the Saudi-led coalition to lift its air, land and naval blockade, and get all the major factions around a conference table, with the promise of getting UN troops to maintain the peace, and of securing Arab money and foreign aid for the rebuilding of Yemen.

Of course, none of that is in stock and ready for the taking. Instead, the new UN envoy for Yemen will have to tweak his notable credentials and incite a little peacemaking magic.

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Geopolitics

As the first signs of spring 2018 dawn upon the nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), it has become all the more reckless to hypothesize as to how the different pieces of the region’s political mosaic will settle. The only responsible take-aways that can be coerced out of this tumultuous first quarter of the year are that peace between Palestinians and Israelis is on ice, while the divide between Sunnis and Shiites is on fire. One or two recent developments are nevertheless noteworthy:

For a start, there is reason to believe that the fervor that ordinary people on the streets of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi had in times past for the Palestinian cause has waned. Had an American administration decreed to move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem only twenty or so years ago, all hell would have broken loose, seriously rocking the boat for some of the region’s regimes. Instead, when President Trump recently made precisely that kind of pronouncement, the burning of tires and effigies on the boulevards was, if anything, muted. Instead, what did in fact emerge was the further cementing of a hitherto forbidden triangular relationship between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel, with Bahrain tagging along its critical Saudi benefactors.

Perhaps to button things up, Israel then chose to follow up by retaliating en masse to, of all things, an Iranian drone that may or may not have pierced its air space. By sending fighter jets to exert a heavy toll on Iranian and Syrian assets inside of Syria, and at the conceivably negligible cost of one of their aircraft, Israel in effect further consolidated its ebbing entente with the Saudis and Emiratis.

That sort of diplomatic and military maneuvering naturally doesn’t happen in a vacuum. The new coalition has Israel relieving the U.S. from having to defend its main Sunni clients from Iranian-backed Shiite hegemony. Did we not hear President Trump repeatedly berate past U.S. administrations for having spent “$7 trillion” on the Middle East? And doesn’t Israel benefit handsomely from opening up Arab markets with tens of millions of new and financially robust consumers? As for the Saudis and Emiratis, they are if anything more comfortable with the ever-ready Israelis having their back than with the invariably unreliable United States. Furthermore, to top it all, Trump’s “America First” and “jobs, jobs, jobs” paradigms get a boost as well, with billions of dollars’ worth of U.S. weaponry supplied annually to all three nations.

And yet, in a part of the world where the discernable is always fickle, and the improbable likely, it is foolhardy, at a time when most anything can derail pacts stronger than that in the Middle East, to proclaim that the die is cast for that alliance. For example, while the Israeli-backed coalition has air dominance, Iran can wield meaningful influence on the ground with its revolutionary guard corps in Iraq and Syria, and its Hezbollah, Hamas, and Houthi proxy brigades in Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen—plus the thousands of artillery rounds and missiles that can reach every part of the region. The Fighting in Yemen as well, to cite another example, seems to be a toss-up as to which of the two sides will bear the brunt of the responsibility for the killed and maimed, and genocidal famine, that the country is experiencing.

As for Saudi Arabia’s current prospects for peace and prosperity, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman could surely use a few more years of consolidation to have the Kingdom’s youth witness in real time some of the benefits of his ambitious 2030 vision and anti-corruption campaign. In the interim, these moves, and the regime’s attempts at breathing a little fresh air into women’s emancipation and other cultural and political freedoms, may have to endure a little more understandable skepticism.


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Economy, Geopolitics

On December 5, 2017, Kuwait Emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani announced the abrupt ending of the 38th Annual Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit on its first day.  According to the Emir, the GCC was considering ways to modify the GCC’s statute to allow for more effective dispute resolution. “Any dispute on the Gulf level must not affect the continuation of the summit.”   This was the first meeting of the GCC since the Arab world’s crisis with Qatar began in June 2017. The diplomatic rift began when several Arab countries (including Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) cut their relationships with Qatar due to their belief that the Qatari government funded terrorism and has close ties to Iran. The crisis has persisted and still remains a difficult thorn in the side of the decades-old GCC. Holding this summit was an indicator for the world that the situation could be resolved and the GCC could remain, as noted by Emir Al Sabah.  But while there had been high hopes that holding the annual meeting may actually bring parties together to address concerns, the fact that only two heads of state (the Emirs of Qatar and Kuwait) attended indicated the rest of the Gulf was not ready to talk. The sudden conclusion of the summit is not a high indicator for success.

The Gulf Cooperation Council has been seen as a success since its inception in 1981. It provided a coordinating platform for the burgeoning oil-producing Arab Gulf countries and a solitary unit to counter the influence of Iran in the wake of the Iranian Revolution. The cultural and historical ties between the six-member states–Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates–is the foundation by which the large, coherent entity was formed. “It is also a fulfilment of the aspirations of its citizens towards some sort of Arab regional unity.”   The GCC has worked to align its economic, social, technological, and military efforts for the mutual benefits of each member state.

One aspect of the GCC that is not well-developed, however, is its dispute resolution mechanism. During the 2017 annual summit, Kuwait Emir Sheikh Al-Sabah noted that a task force may be set up to deal with the crisis between the GCC and Qatar, but the GCC already has such mechanisms to handle these problems. In fact, this is not the first rift among Qatar and the GCC. Kuwait mediated this issue in 2014 when similar concerns over Qatar’s foreign policy emerged and Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE cut diplomatic ties.

The primary concern, of course, for the member states is survival of this unifying platform. “The last thing we need is for the GCC, the most perfect body in the Arab world, to catch the flu or catch the disease of Arab fragmentation and splintering,” says Abdullah Al Shayji, Professor of Political Science at Kuwait University. Various divisive issues have risen particularly since the Arab Spring protests in 2011 and the current U.S. administration’s approach to unifying the Sunni Arab world against the Shi’a Iranian threat leads to an additional pressure among GCC members. Part of this is being fueled by the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed Bin Salman. The young prince’s ambitious modernization efforts have been rapid as of late and media reports indicate he was behind the UAE’s recent announcement of a new coordination effort with Saudi Arabia. “According to the Resolution, the Committee is assigned to cooperate and coordinate between the UAE and Saudi Arabia in all military, political, economic, trade and cultural fields, as well as others, in the interest of the two countries.”  There are concerns that such a step indicates the beginning of the end of the GCC in its current composition and unity may be no more.

Convening the GCC member states did indeed illustrate that the cooperation body still holds meaning for the Gulf, but the inability to resolve the crisis with Qatar may lead to additional long-term problems. The new Emirati-Saudi cooperation agreement could just be first of many launched among the member states to maneuver around the Qataris, but the fact remains that the blockade is costing all members billions of dollars in lost revenue. A break among the Gulf states could also mean a weaker Sunni front to the perceived encroachment Iranian influence in the region as the Syrian and Yemeni civil wars rage on. We may very well see rapid reform instituted in the GCC to deal with the diplomatic crisis, but it is unlikely to be successful as long as the Sunni Arab states demand foreign policy changes that the government of Qatar believes puts them in a difficult position.

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Geopolitics

Tunisia has reached a fork in the road. At the end of one path, there is a complete democratic transition wherein the voices of the citizens are heard, rights are acknowledged, and the economy is liberalized. Down the other, there is a fragile central government unable to respond quickly to reform, a flat economy, and the omnipresent threat of recruitment by extremist groups of unemployed youth. Both of these paths are impacted by corruption. Since the fall of the Zine El Abidine Ben Ali regime in 2011, the newly minted democratic state has tried to stabilise operations and begin the implementation of various reforms, but the lingering effects of political instability caused by various successive governments, political party in-fighting, and the informal economy (which was at the centre of the situation involving the self-immolation of street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi that sparked the revolution) continue to fuel corrupt practices.

In fact, corruption has risen, according to Chawki Tabib, the head of the Tunisian Anti-Corruption Committee. “The CPI [corruption perception index] which is issued annually by TI [Transparency International], confirmed its increase. In 2010, which marked Ben Ali’s final year in power, Tunisia occupied the 59th position according to the CPI, while it made it to the 76th position in 2015.” Tabib explained most recently that while the government continues to prosecute members of the Ben Ali regime in court, the corrupt system is still in place that benefitted the few and due to weaknesses in the government, others have been able to exploit the system. He goes on to say that stamping out corruption in Tunisia can only be successful with political will.

How does this play out in the lives of average Tunisians? Corruption touches nearly every facet of life around the country. As most people rely heavily on government-subsidised services, declining capabilities by the government often leads to paying bribes in order to get the most basic services to be carried out. Dealing with the police, judiciary, businesses, and educational institutions are often marred by corrupt dealings since the “democratisation of corruption” has occurred since the Arab Spring revolutions. In other words, since the revolution, it not only the government involved in corrupt activities; now, with weak government institutions, there is little preventing corruption across many sectors.

In April 2017, a journalist broke the story that the parliament had reintroduced a bill to give amnesty to those who had taken part in corrupt dealings during the Ben Ali regime; the public response was swift. Protests erupted and were followed by additional demonstrations and skirmishes in May 2017 when the government sent the army to the oil fields in southern Tunisia to protect the area from protesters who had turned off the pipeline. There was a perception that the government was hiring those outside of the community to come in and work in the oil fields and little of that money was invested back into the community. “The protesters’ demands have steadily solidified: a quota of jobs for local people at the oil companies drilling in the region, the creation of jobs in an environmental agency and an investment fund for job creation programs.” Later that month, the Prime Minister Youssef Chahed launched a campaign aimed at cracking down on corruption across the public and private sectors. While the campaign has been immensely popular among Tunisians, there are those that believe the campaign was strategically launched to turn attention away from the country’s economic woes.

Because Tunisia has been the darling of the international community since the Arab Spring protests, international assistance is saturating the scene. The International Monetary Fund started implementation of a 4-year Extended Fund Facility (EEF) in 2016. In August 2017, Björn Rother of the IMF visited Tunisia to check on progress of the EEF’s implementation. “The outlook for the Tunisian economy is slowly improving, but challenges remain. Growth is on track to reach 2.3 percent in 2017, supported by a pick-up in phosphates, agriculture, and tourism. But structural obstacles in the economy continue to weigh on exports.” Structural obstacles include systemic and widespread corruption, but with the government’s new anti-corruption campaign, there is hope that it will boost business confidence in Tunisia.

As Tunisia progresses on this path toward economic development, there will be bumps along the way and dealing with corruption will continue to be a priority. The government’s efforts to become more transparent and accountable is in direct response to not only the Arab Spring protests, but also because the government understands that democratic transition must go hand in hand with economic development, thus addressing the most basic demands of the Tunisian youth.

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Geopolitics, Investment
For a long time China had viewed the Middle East as a US influence zone. But, as a reflection of its growing power and ambitions, it is now becoming a more visible actor in the Middle East. Beijing’s involvement in the region is primarily motivated by its economic interests. Qatar is China’s top gas provider and Saudi Arabia is its second largest oil supplier. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) serves as a distribution centre for China as most Chinese exports to the Gulf Cooperation Council, West Asia, Africa, and Europe go through the UAE. As demonstrated in the table below, its trade relations with the region have also grown tremendously and are likely to grow further. In fact, it has recently signed a major deal with Saudi Arabia that worth nearly $65 billion and agreed to increase bilateral trade with Iran to $600 billion in the next ten years.

 

China’s trade volume with S. Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Turkey, and UAE in 2005 vs. 2015

 

 

Saudi Arabia

Iran

Egypt

Turkey

UAE

Year

Export

Import

Exports

Imports

Exports

Imports

Exports

Imports

Exports

Imports

2005

3,824

12,246

3,297

6,787

1,934

211

4,254

622

8,730

2,046

2015

21,684

30,151

17,831

16,035

11,963

916

18,63

2,961

37,069

11,532

Note: Total Import / Export Value in millions of US Dollars – current value.

Source: Compiled from the World Integrated Trade Solution database (World Bank), which is available at http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/CHN/Year/2005/TradeFlow/EXPIMP/Partner/ARE/Product/all-groups

China’s interest in the Middle East is also related to its ambitious “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI). In 2014 Beijing launched this $40 billion project that aims to revive the Silk Road, its ancient trade network, to connect China to Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe through roads, railways, ports, and oil and gas pipelines. There are already noteworthy achievements. For example, in 2016, a freight train made the journey from China to Iran in just 14 days, significantly shortening the regular 45 days delivery time via sea route. Beijing is also currently negotiating a free trade agreement with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and working with Israel on a railway proposal to connect the Red Sea to the Mediterranean that bypasses the Suez Canal. Once completed, the BRI will significantly boost China’s trade and economic relations globally.

There are also political motives that might explain the recent momentum in China-Middle East relations. Beijing’s most important foreign policy conflict involves the South China Sea (SCS), which is one of the most strategic commercial shipping routes in the world and also contains significant natural resource reserves. Beijing claims sovereignty for nearly the entire SCS. However, the United States doesn’t recognise Beijing’s claim, viewing it as a violation of international law and maintains a strong military presence in the region to challenge China. As a rising power, China first needs to secure control of its neighbourhood. Its greater involvement in the Middle East may help China in this regard by diverting US attention away from the SCC to the Middle East. In fact Beijing announced its first “Arab Policy Paper” in 2016, recently opened its first overseas naval base in Djibouti and started the construction of an arms factory in Saudi Arabia to manufacture armed. Others had previously refused as China has grasped the opportunity.

Beijing also actively promotes the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in the Middle East, a security organisation jointly led by China and Russia. Iran applied for SCO membership in 2008 and Turkish President Erdogan mentioned in 2016 that Turkey could also seek SCO membership. India and Pakistan have recently become full members, and China’s Deputy Foreign Minister Li Hailai stated that Beijing “welcomes and supports Iran’s wish to become a formal member of the SCO” and would also consider Turkey’s membership if it files an application. China’s Ankara ambassador also stated in May 2017 that Beijing “is ready for Turkey’s membership.”.

China is now a more active player in the Middle East, not only in economic but also in political terms. China’s active engagement in the Middle East may actually contribute to stability in the region. A stable Middle East serves China’s interests better as conflicts within the Middle East such as the Qatar crisis pose a threat to its energy supplies, free-trade negotiations, BRI project, and regional trade prospects. Beijing emphasises sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the principle of non-intervention and avoids taking a clear side in political conflicts in the area. It maintains good relations with both Iran and Saudi Arabia and has no major enemy in the region. Beijing appears to be an honest and impartial broker in Middle East conflicts and may soon play a greater role in mediating disputes, which may further strengthen its standing in the region in future.

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Geopolitics, Investment
In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt cut political and economic ties with Qatar over an accusation that it supports terrorism in the region. Qatar, a small Gulf country that tries to pursue an “independent” foreign policy, has been under intense pressure by the Saudi camp. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and UAE accused Qatar of sponsoring terrorism in the region several times in the past and even withdrew their diplomatic missions in 2014 for eight months. But this time the Saudi Camp has more support in the region and appears to be more aggressive. Qatar’s policymakers are now in a difficult position. Their domestic legitimacy and international standing will significantly weaken if they submit to the Saudi camp, but will face a political and economic isolation if they don’t.

Turkish President Erdogan harshly criticised the Saudi-led sanctions, immediately started delivering food supplies to the country and quickly ratified a previously signed military agreement to deploy troops to a Turkish military base in Qatar.

Turkey and Qatar already had strong ties before the crisis. Their foreign policies have been in alignment in most critical issues threatening the region. Both Turkey and Qatar have opposed the military coup in Egypt that carried Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to power, refused to recognise Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist organisations, and provided support for the rebel groups that fight against the Assad regime in Syria. Moreover, to the dismay of Saudi Arabia, which views Iran as a major security threat to its livelihood and thus aims to isolate it, Turkey and Qatar refuse to distance themselves from Iran.

Thus, what brings Turkey and Qatar closer is their similar foreign policy orientations in the region. The Erdogan administration doesn’t have many allies left in the region with a similar foreign policy outlook and is likely to face further political isolation in if it loses Qatar.

There are also additional reasons that might explain why Turkey backs Qatar in the conflict. On 18 December 2016, during one of their frequent meetings, Qatari Emir Al Thani signed an arms trade deal with Erdogan, agreeing to buy $2 billion worth of arms from Turkey. Qatar’s strong reserves serve as a foreign policy tool for the country. Such deals, whilst helping Qatar to diversify its arms suppliers, are particularly important for Erdogan as his administration which has been heavily investing in domestic arms production with a declared aim to change Turkey from being an ‘arms importer’ to an ‘exporter.’ The arms deal with Qatar in this regard sends a signal to Erdogan’s conservative supporters that the country is on the right track.

Qatar also serves as an emergency energy supplier for Turkey, which is located in an unstable political neighbourhood and has to rely on Russia and Iran for its energy needs. But this means that Turkey’s energy security is always at risk. Qatar provided liquefied gas to Turkey when its gas supplies were threatened after it shot down a Russian warplane in November 2015, demonstrating how important it is for Turkey to have a reliable energy supplier at the times of crisis.

Qatar also provides an investment platform for Turkish companies that have lost their market shares in Libya, Egypt, Russia, Iraq, and Syria. This is especially important for the Turkish construction industry, which is one of the most prominent sectors in Turkey and dominated by contractors with close ties to Erdogan. The Turkish construction industry has already set its sights on the $170 billion investment budget that Qatar has allocated for its hosting of the 2022 World Cup. In fact, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Simsek recently said: “Turkish contractors have undertaken projects worth $13.7 billion in Qatar. Qatar is according positive discrimination to Turkey not only in words but also in deeds, giving strong support to Turkish companies doing business there… I’d like to also underline that we are ready to provide any contribution to our Qatari friends in the 2022 World Cup organization.” (http://www.atimes.com/article/qatari-money-rise-turkey/)

It should be noted that Turkey’s support to Qatar is primarily motivated by political concerns, not by economic ones. In fact, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have always been a more important economic partner for Turkey and the Erdogan administration has been trying to further improve Turkey’s economic relations with them. According to the World Bank trade data, Turkey’s exports to the UAE totalled $4.7 billion and to Saudi Arabia $3.5 billion in 2015, while the same figure for Qatar was only $423 million. (http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/TUR/Year/2015/TradeFlow/EXPIMP/Partner/SAU/Product/all-groups) But there are now social media campaigns in Saudi Arabia and the UAE that call people to boycott Turkish products. (http://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/calls-from-saudi-arabia-and-uae-to-boycott-products-of-turkey-amid-qatar-crisis-163961.html). There are also reports that the Al-Sisi government in Egypt has asked the Saudi-led coalition to apply economic sanctions against Turkey. (https://www.middleeastobserver.org/2017/06/16/37406/)

Because Turkey’s foreign policy orientation is similar to that of Qatar, it delivers a great blow to Turkey’s international legitimacy and standing if Qatar submits to the Saudi camp. But Turkey has also no intention of upsetting its relations with Saudi Arabia and its allies like the UAE. Having said this Ankara cannot assume a mediator role in the crisis because of its involvement in Qatar. This is why Erdogan’s July 23-24 visit to Gulf countries may be interpreted as a damage control attempt by Erdogan to show that Turkey’s involvement in Qatar is not an anti-Saudi move and his administration would like to maintain good relations with the Saudi camp. The problem lies in the fact that Turkey has already become a party to the conflict. At the moment, the Erdogan administration can only hope that the mediation efforts undertaken by Kuwait and the United States will resolve the crisis on favourable terms to Turkey.
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