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Sudan has been in political upheaval since late December 2018 when thousands took to the streets to the protest increasing cost of living and a woeful economy.  The protests continued and picked up steam resulting in President Omar al-Bashir being ousted by the military in April.


Pro-democracy protesters are now flooding the streets to demand the ruling Transitional Military Council (TMC) hand over power to a civilian group.  The protestors are continuing their calls for democracy in the face inhumane repression from the TMC including a brutal crackdown dubbed the Khartoum Massacre on June 3rd when TMC forces massacred 128 people and raped 70.


The military’s misdeeds have not stopped despite international condemnation, and on July 29th TMC forces killed four high school students and an adult participating in a peaceful demonstration.  In response, the military closed schools indefinitely.


The European Union has repeatedly called on the Sudanese government to cede power to a civilian group, and the United States has made similar statements.  However, America’s regional allies and geopolitical games much larger than Sudanese internal politics have impeded the democratic demands of the Sudanese people.


 Saudi Arabia


Saudi Arabia is a key player in Sudanese politics, and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman has enjoyed robust support from American President Donald Trump.  Saudi Arabia plays an important role in Sudan due to its economic investment into the country and repeated intervention into the country’s economy and politics.


Sudan’s latest political revolution is a call back to the Arab Spring, a political movement across the Middle East which struck fear in many Arab world elites.  Saudi Arabia prefers its sphere of influence to be stable, in order to keep business flowing and lessen inspiration for any political revolutions in their own country.


In fact, Saudi Arabia has said as much.  The Saudi Press Agency made an official statement after the Khartoum Massacre in June that said, “The Kingdom hopes that all parties in Sudan will choose wisdom and constructive dialogue to preserve security and stability in Sudan, protect the people of Sudan from all harm, while maintaining Sudan’s interests and unity.”


Russia also made ambiguous comments, but they seemed to place more blame at the feet of protestors.  Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov said, “naturally, in order to do that, you need for order to be imposed, and you need to fight against extremists and provocateurs who don’t want the stabilization of the situation,”


Rather than forcefully condemning the military the Saudis focused on “all parties”.  This was the Saudi’s response in large part due to their proximity to the TMC.  Similarly to Saudi Arabia, Russia also prefers stability in the region over any democratic regime change.


Cooperation on Iran


As with many current regional concerns, the geopolitical games trace back to America and Saudi Arabia’s combined anti-Iran strategy.


Saudi Arabia and Mohammed Bin Salman have been in constant contact with the transitional military government ever since al-Bashir was overthrown.  In this time, Sudan has recommitted to fighting Iran with Saudi Arabia and maintains forces in the Yemen war in support of Saudi Arabia.


“Sudan is standing with the kingdom against all threats and attacks from Iran and Houthi militias,” Sudanese General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo said during a meeting with Saudi diplomats.


The United States also plays a pivotal role in the excessive force used by the Sudanese military against protestors. Shortly before the June massacre, US Congress blocked President Trump’s plans to sell munitions to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.  However, plans were shortly leaked on how the President could get billions of dollars of arms to Saudi Arabia and its allies.


Saudi Arabia is a crucial military ally to Sudan and the TMC is heavily funded and armed by the Saudi government.  This arms pipeline ties the American government to the TMC, and Saudi Arabia has regularly propped up the transitional Sudanese government with cash injections to increase their stability and power.


Protestors to Foreign Influence: “Stay Away”


For their part, Sudanese protestors and civilian groups are on top of the impact that many Middle Eastern countries have on their internal politics.  Already in April, protestors were recorded chanting in the streets urging Saudi Arabia and the UAE to “please keep your money” a day after the governments sent Sudan a $3 billion aid package.


The protestor’s suspicions are well-warranted considering the Saudis’ crushing response to protest movements in neighbouring countries during the Arab Spring.


Egypt and the African Union have also played an important role and drawn the ire of protestors for extending the transitional deadline at the behest of strongman Egyptian President el-Sisi.


As Sudanese protesters and civil society build distrust for foreign intervention, more needs to be done to ensure that actors with ulterior motives are limited in their impact on the future of Sudanese political and civil life.


The European Union has made strong comments, but more needs to be done to hold the United States to account for their abetting strategy of Saudi Arabia.  Unfortunately for the Sudanese, they seem to be caught in the crosshairs of a hawkish anti-Iran strategy that is spilling out all across the globe and further destabilizing countries such as Sudan.


Recent Constitutional Declaration


Despite the odds against the pro-democracy movement, the Sudanese people did achieve a huge victory on August 4 when the TMC agreed to a constitutional declaration with the opposition coalition which will form a three-year transitional government.


The former power of former leader al-Bashir still has deep roots in the country’s political system, and the military will still get to decide the minister of defence and interior.  But it is viewed as a positive step in the drawn-out battle for democracy.


Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the military will change its foreign policy strategy, and Sudan will likely still rely on contributions from their allies including Saudi Arabia and Egypt.  And despite the positive moves, the pro-democracy protestors and the international community will still have to keep an eye on proceedings to assure that the military does not cross the line once again.



Libya has been locked in a civil war since 2014 leaving the country in turmoil and regional partners scrambling for power in the fragile nation.  Fighting has ramped up in 2019, and General Khalifa Haftar’s anti-government LNA forces began an aggressive offensive against the Libyan government in April.


Haftar’s forces are sieging Tripoli, where the government led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj is based.  Haftar is not popular in the West due to his aggressive tactics, but he is backed by the UAE and Egypt, and he enjoys tepid support from some Western powers.  Haftar also met with Mohammed bin Salman in the Saudi capital shortly before launching the offensive on Tripoli.


With Russia attempting to play multiple sides and the United States offering a muddled policy on the conflict, Turkey and Qatar have emerged as the main actors fighting against Haftar and both have provided resources to militias fighting the LNA.  The United Nations is the biggest player in support of the interim government.


With the UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia on one side and Turkey and Qatar on the other, Libya could devolve into a proxy war on a scale similar to Syria or Yemen.  If other global and regional powers do not step up to deescalate the violence, Libyans will continue to suffer at the hands of military force from within and outside of the country.


Migrant Centre Attack and European Migrant Deal


On July 3, a migrant detention centre in Tripoli was hit by an air strike resulting in over 60 deaths and more than 100 injuries.  Most of the migrants were Africans in route to Europe but caught and detained by Libyan forces.


The United Nations forcefully condemned the attack and the UN-backed GNA, led by Sarraj, accused Haftar of being behind the air strikes with help from the UAE.  The government alleged a UAE fighter jet made in the United States carried out the deadly attack.


The European Union struck a deal with Libyan authorities in 2017 to stem the flow of migrants into Europe, but the UN and other political organizations have come out against the EU’s policy.  Reports have linked the EU-Libya migration deal with migrants being traded on open slave markets and many migrants living in appalling and inhumane conditions.


The latest attack will put further pressure on European governments to take a concrete position on the Libyan Civil War and deescalate tensions in the region.  If it wants to save the controversial migrant deal then the Union may have to do more than stay on the sidelines when it comes to Libya.


The European Union has struggled to develop a united front on Libya due to France’s mild support for Haftar in contrast to other European nations.  When the LNA offensive began in April, France blocked an EU statement calling for Haftar to halt the military offensive.


President Emmanuel Macron, quite similar to American President Donald Trump, sees Haftar as an ally in fighting Islamic extremism in Northern Africa, despite Haftar’s recent overtures to religious elements at the behest of the Saudi government.  France’s position cripples any European Union play at peacekeeping, and locks the Europeans out of a seat at the table.


The tension between southern European countries fervent support of the Libya migrant deal and Macron’s focus on Islamic extremism is a major flashpoint when the European Union discusses Libya.


One would expect Haftar to be under increased pressure after his forces were accused of committing the attack.  However, survivors of the migrant centre attack have reported they can still hear air attacks and fear for their lives.


Before the offensive on Tripoli, one of Haftar’s key allies, Egypt, was looking at alternative solutions including supporting the government.  But, Haftar’s offensive forced Egypt’s hand to double down its commitment to the LNA.  If Haftar’s forces are connected to the attack then Egypt may be forced to reconsider its position once again.


Proxy War?


The United Nations is the biggest international actor supporting the interim government of Prime Minister Sarraj.  The United States has wavered in its position, Russia has been talking with all sides, and the European Union has failed to provide a united front.


In turn, this has led to countries in the region with hardened stances having the greatest role in the continuation of the war.  Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia all have economic and political interests in Haftar seizing more control of Libya.


However, with the interim government holding out in Tripoli, neither side looks to be the outright winner in this conflict any time soon.  Instead, the fighting is at risk of turning into a protracted proxy war that will devastate the Libyan people and further destabilize the region.


Without a firm position calling for a ceasefire, the conflict will wage on and increase in its bloodiness.  Rather than concern itself with resolving the conflict, the international community is divided on the issue and fighting over political and economic control of the war-torn region.


Growing tensions between Washington and Tehran appeared to reach a head last week, following suspected attacks against two oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman on Thursday 13th June, the blame for which US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has placed squarely with Iran.

The suspected attacks come amidst rising geopolitical tensions as the US seeks to strangle Iranian oil exports in a bid to pressurise Iran to desist from uranium enrichment and curb Tehran’s regional ambitions across the Middle East. Iran, for its part appears to be playing with fire, aiming to foment instability in global oil markets in order to pressurise Trump to ease the sanctions crippling the Iranian economy at risk of provoking a wider conflagration.

This latest crisis comes after President Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme in May 2018, a move followed by the Administration’s designation of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps as a proscribed terrorist organisation this April. In response to Washington’s ‘maximum pressure’ strategy, Tehran stands accused of sponsoring a series of attacks against tankers near the Emirati port of Fujairah last month, creating a situation which may be likened to that of a tinderbox awaiting a spark.

Despite ominous comparisons to the 2003 Iraq War amidst bellicose rhetoric from both sides, the hard fact remains that a violent conflagration would almost certainly serve neither sides’ strategic interests. In recognition of this, recent statements from both Trump and Rouhani shy away from the prospect of open hostilities. Whether conflict can be averted though fundamentally hinges on whether both leaders can resist pressure from hardliners in Washington and Tehran as well as each side avoiding dangerous misperceptions of the others’ intentions which could inadvertently drag the US and Iran into unwanted confrontation.

Washington’s Dilemma

America’s posture towards the Iran has been extensively criticised as being wildly inconsistent, with Washington blowing hot and cold towards Tehran. Despite President Trump’s decision to tear up the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, arguably a knee jerk response driven by his pressing need to undo any legacy of the Obama Administration, the executive has vacillated between aggressive posturing and appeasement. One might argue Trump is seeking to repeat his successful rapprochement with North Korea in 2017, taking a carrot-and-stick approach to bring Tehran to the negotiating table on his terms.

But Iran is not North Korea. Tehran is a formidable foe with a large, highly motivated military, difficult terrain and no shortage of allies on the international stage. Given the immense military, political and economic strains the ‘forever wars’ in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed on the US with little to show for the effort, it is highly unlikely Washington desires a rinse and repeat against a far more implacable foe.

This is not to mention the profound ramifications even a limited conflict would have on global markets, with conservative estimates suggesting oil prices could shoot to $250 per barrel in such an event, as well as the increased geopolitical instability across the region such a showdown would likely precipitate.

Though Trump may not want war, the hawkish advisors he’s surrounded himself with have less reservations. In the White House Secretary of State Mike Pompeo as National Security Advisor John Bolton have adopted a ‘maximum pressure’ strategy towards Iran centred on a sanctions regime aimed to bring Iranian oil revenues ‘to zero’. Both individuals have a long history of supporting regime change in the Middle East, with Bolton in particular playing a key role in the decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Simultaneously, both see a hardline on Iran as crucial to discredit the Democrats, who argue Obama’s olive branch to Tehran was paying dividends, in the run-up to the 2020 elections.

Tehran’s Dilemma

For Iran, of course, outright confrontation would likely be disastrous, and Tehran knows it. This, however, does not remove the immense internal and external pressures driving the regime towards open conflict.

On one level, the Iranian economy is clearly buckling under the weight of sanctions, especially after Trump announced the suspension of sanction exemptions to major importers of Iranian oil, such as China, India and Japan in April. Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia has increased its oil output to sell to former buyers of Iranian oil, thus increasing resentment against Tehran’s major regional rival. Subjected to such pressures, it is perhaps no surprise that Iran has opted its confrontational stance, judging that it has nothing to lose when economic warfare is as damaging to Iran as actual warfare.

In fact, Iran’s latest actions in the Persian Gulf – if it was indeed Tehran that carried out the attacks, are highly calculated, seeking to demonstrate the vulnerability of one of the world’s most important strategic choke points to Iranian pressure. Moreover, the regime may seek to drive a wedge between the US and its allies, pressurising the Europeans and Japanese to encourage Washington to ease sanctions.

Tehran, however, is playing a dangerous game. Much as in Washington, hardliners aligned with the IRGC seek to bolster their appeal ahead of next year’s parliamentary elections, pressurising previously moderate politicians such as President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif who agreed to unilaterally stand by the JCPOA despite Trump’s withdrawal to demonstrate their anti-American credentials for domestic purposes. This suggests that Iran is at a crossroads, raising fears of a fundamental power shift from the moderates to the hardliners in Tehran – a power shift that may just tip the ongoing proxy conflict towards open confrontation.

The idea that America and Iran are set on a collision course is a fallacy. Open conflict in the Persian Gulf can be averted – whether it is or not depends whether prudence or hot headedness prevails – both in Washington and Tehran.

-Written by William Marshall for Pegasus Strategic Advisory Ltd.



Economy, Geopolitics

The European Parliament elections which wrapped up on 26 May are not the end all be all when it comes to the European Union, but the election results show voting populations and member states are politically fragmented.  Balancing 28-member state interests means that the transnational political body does not always have a unified position on complex geopolitical issues. 


With this said, the Union still has an important role in the international community and many European actors want to have an impact on the issues of the day.  So, this piece will analyse what role the European Union and key member states are playing in growing tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and how effective it is in achieving its goals.




The United States has played a pivotal role in ramping up international tensions between the two regional powers.  President Trump’s administration has cozied up to Saudi Arabia and taken an antagonistic stance towards Iran to the delight of their Saudi allies. 


Most recently, the White House accused Iran of sabotaging four tankers off the coast of the UAE.  Two of the ships were Saudi, but no hard evidence has been produced to link Iran to the damage.  US national security adviser John Bolton repeated these claims without evidence on 30 May in Abu Dhabi, adding an accusation that Iran is responsible for a recent failed attack on Saudi Arabia’s port city, Yanbu.


Trump’s decision to leave the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the nuclear non-proliferation agreement between Iran and the world’s nuclear powers, also plays a large role in the current situation, and it placed the European Union in an awkward position.


European Union’s Growing Role


After the United States decided to renege on the Iran deal, many anticipated the European Union to play a balancing role to the hard-American stance on Iran.  European leaders have repeatedly expressed their commitment to the deal and have taken a more neutral stance to Iran-Saudi tensions.


The ascendance of a hawkish American policy toward Iran has placed the European Union in a difficult position, one in which Europe is often playing the role of contradicting US policy, despite their supposed alliance with the Americans.  Europe’s position is much less extreme, and it has been accused of being drowned out by the forceful words of the Americans.


Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif stated in early May that the EU had been bullied by America, and the Europeans had failed to speak forcefully against the US for breaking the nuclear deal and slapping more sanctions on Iran.  Several days before Zarif’s statement, EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini and the foreign ministers of Germany, France, and the UK released a joint statement reading, “we… take note with regret and concern of the decision by the United States not to extend waivers with regards to trade in oil with Iran. We also note with concern the decision by the United States not to fully renew waivers for nuclear non-proliferation projects in the framework of the JCPoA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action).”


Iran and Zarif were disappointed that all the EU was offering was “regret and concern” instead of more forcefully rejecting the United States’ breaking of the deal.  In response, Iran made several ultimatums and said they would stop abiding by several commitments due to the United States’ re-imposition of sanctions.


The EU issued a similar statement expressing concern about Iran’s commitment to the nuclear deal and rejecting any ultimatums made by Iran.


With Saudi Arabia and the United States on one side and Iran on the other, both sides are attempting to make the European Union choose a side.  But Europe has so far tried to remain neutral, a position made more difficult as the positions harden.


War in Iran?


President Trump, flanked by hawkish advisers, has made a variety of statements hinting at war with Iran in the hopes of effecting regime change.  Saudi Arabia has likewise issued hard words to this end, signifying a unified American-Saudi front.


So far, the European Union has rejected any notion of a threat from Iran and British Major General Chris Ghika broke from the American line that Iran is a danger and said, “no, there has been no increased threat from Iranian-backed forces in Iraq or Syria.”


Ghika’s words are particularly notable as he is the deputy commander of an American-led coalition fighting the Islamic State.


American Secretary of State Mike Pompeo once again failed to curry favour for a more confrontational stance from the EU toward Iran during a mid-May meeting in Brussels.  Instead, Mogherini urged Pompeo to take a cautious approach to Iran, “we are living in crucial delicate moments where the most responsible attitude to take and should be is maximum restraint and avoiding any escalation on the military side.”


An all-out war in Iran or any intervention to facilitate regime change does not have the support of the European Union, and for now, it appears that the United States has failed to generate support for such actions at home or abroad.  But, the European Union’s more neutral stance on the Saudi Arabian-Iranian tensions will always face challenges as long as the United States strongly supports the Saudi Arabian stance.


Without taking a forceful position in support of Iran or against the United States and Saudi Arabia, the European Union runs the risk of being side lined in favour of more aggressive actors.  The European Union’s ‘neutral’ stance is also compromised by continued arms shipments to Saudi Arabia, a development left unchecked that undermines Europe’s commitment to peaceful resolutions and conflict prevention.


Economy, Geopolitics

President Donald Trump announced plans to end exemptions from sanctions for countries purchasing oil from Iran.  The sudden announcement will have broad impacts on the world economy and international relations, some more hidden than others.


The White House’s staunch opposition to Iran comes as no surprise considering Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Advisor John Bolton are both notoriously hawkish towards Iran.  This latest move shows that the White House is showing no sign of rapprochement with Iran and will continue their antagonistic stance which has further hardened recently.


Early in April, President Trump designated Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a foreign terrorist group.  Iran responded in turn by declaring the United States military is a terrorist organization.


The end to exemptions from sanctions is an attempt from the United States to drive Iranian oil exports to zero.  Iran is already feeling the pressure from previous sanctions and an end to its oil exports would be disastrous.  The IMF has reported that Iran is tumbling into an economic recession, and the most recent numbers show inflation at 40 percent and a forecasted 6 percent reduction in the Iranian economy in the upcoming year.


But more than just affecting America’s bilateral relations with Iran and Iran’s economy, the announcement threatens sanctions to valuable trade partners and economic powers such as India, China, South Korea, and Turkey.  It also has far-reaching implications on Middle Eastern politics.




Turkey could be particularly hard hit by this decision as President Erdoğan has increasingly pivoted toward Iran as a trade partner as tensions have soured with Saudi Arabia and other regional partners.


An economic downturn now would come at a particularly inopportune time for Erdoğan considering his party AKP’s unexpected defeats during recent local elections.  Voters in Istanbul and Ankara both voted for opposition party CHP to take over the mayoral office in a stark rebuke to Erdogan, former mayor of Istanbul.  Turkish voters have been animated by economic disparity in the country, so the ruling political elites are vulnerable in the event of an oil crash.


Next to Iraq, Turkey is one of the countries with the greatest reliance on Iranian oil, despite ratcheting down oil imports from Turkey over the last two years in expectation of America’s hardened stance toward Iran.  However, Turkey’s foreign ministry announced that their trade ministry would be working with Iran to circumvent any new American sanctions to keep up oil trade between the two partners.


Simultaneously, the Turkish foreign ministry is working to convince the White House that the sanctions are bad for business.  But Turkey and the United States seem to be growing apart as Turkey continues to work with Iran and increases its ties to Russia.




Iran is Iraq’s most important regional trade partner, and Iraq is heavily reliant on Iran for oil amongst other energy sources. 


Iraq’s Prime Minister Abdul Mehdi made a statement on the tensions between America and Iran and said, “we are going to deploy all our efforts to ease and calm down the situation.  It is not in the interest of any of the parties engaged.”


The United States still has around 5,000 active duty troops in Iraq despite factions within the Iraqi government asking for the American troops to leave.  President Trump has stated his policy on American troops is to keep them in Iraq to keep an eye on Iran.


But the Iraqi government may be pushed into a corner if America continues its hard line stance on one of its most valuable partners, Iran.  Harming Iran could cripple Iraq’s economy, and it has already begun to look for other great powers outside of the US.


Russia and Iraq held high-level bilateral meetings at a two-day conference and came to 16 agreements.  One of the highlights of the meeting was Russian-Iraqi trade in oil and gas.  Russian energy giant Lukoil is heavily investing in the Iraqi economy, and Lukoil’s president met with Prime Minister Abdul Mehdi in late March.


Both Iraq and Russia committed to deepening ties between the two states during the meetings, and developments in their relationship indicate that Iraq is turning away from America into the hands of Russia as a direct result of America’s anti-Iran stance.


Oil Prices


Outside of foreign relations, the latest anti-Iran move is expected to cost Americans at the gasoline pump.  If prices hike significantly during the summer months, the Trump administration may face the brunt of anti-motorist sentiment.


Americans are particularly sensitive about their gas prices, and President Trump often appears to be very sensitive to his supporter’s perception of him.  If his Fox News allies turn on him due to rising gas prices then he could decide to change course on a whim.


President Trump has indicated that Saudi Arabia and the UAE will pick up production to cover for the loss of Iranian oil to the global market.  However, neither state has committed to a plan to pick up their production.


Unfortunately, American foreign policy is quite unpredictable in the age of Trump, however, his foreign policy confidants have been steadfast in their opposition to Iran.  If one was taking bets, you would expect the Trump administration to remain firm in their position toward Iran despite potential backlash from the public.


Algerians have taken to the street since March 1 to protest President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s 20-year reign of the country, and through mass political action, they have secured his eventual departure from the presidential office.  But many protestors are demanding more, and in a post-Bouteflika Algeria, the political battle to restructure the country has already begun.


First some background, President Bouteflika announced he would stand for a fifth term as president, and on March 1 Algerians began taking to the street en masse with estimates of over 1 million people protesting the President’s decision.  Bouteflika has been ill since 2006, and he has had several long hospital visits in Paris due to poor health.  After suffering a stroke in 2013, he has not spoken in public for seven years.


After ten days of protests and unrest, Bouteflika announced he would not be seeking a fifth term, and he postponed the presidential elections until April 18.  A clear half-measure to appease protestors, many Algerians are still upset with the current government and argue the president is trying to extend his reign as long as possible.


Deeper Demands


While Bouteflika announced he will not seek another presidential term, protestors and oppositional forces are demanding more than simply a passing of the torch.


Algeria has a long history of political revolution and struggle, but Bouteflika survived the Arab Spring, and he has been relatively unaffected by local protest until the outbreak of the latest nationwide gatherings.  The Algerian president has been able to successfully quell reform movements in the past, and many believe his postponement of the presidential election is attempted manoeuvre to keep the opposition down.


Human Rights Watch has criticized Bouteflika’s post-Arab Spring reforms as a mechanism to stifle political opposition rather than allowing citizens more access to democracy and a safer public forum.


The continuing protests in the face of Bouteflika’s concession point to the population being upset at more than the president’s long service in office.  Bouteflika’s declining health likely means he is not pulling the strings, but rather political structures backing him have been able to dictate the country’s policy.


Opposition political parties have been hosting talks with key oppositional forces including human rights lawyers and former prime ministers.  Some protest movements and opposition forces are seeking constitutional reform that would attempt to fix many of the loopholes the current government has used to repress popular movements.


Government Options


However, Bouteflika’s political allies will not hand over control without pushback. But, the range of options declines as the government waits longer to act whilst protest numbers swell.  Bouteflika-aligned parties could decide that resignation would be the best course of action, or a transition led by an independent organization seeking small constitutional reform is also an option.


The worst option for the country and the region would be for the party to reinstate Bouteflika as the presidential candidate.  This would be done with the idea to justify military intervention to quell the subsequent unrest.  However, there have been no signs that the government or any parties have the political power to carry out such a plan considering the impressive number of Algerians on the street.


Likely, those in power will seek a more technocratic solution to the mass protests, offering small concessions to opposition forces.  Bouteflika appointed a close political ally, Noureddine Bedoui, and he has proposed a “technocratic interim government.”  Bedoui has said this interim government will give a stronger voice to the large number of young people in the country, but he and the government have not yet released a new date for elections to take place.


These concessions are unlikely to convince many protestors considering they come from a friend of Bouteflika.


Regional and Global Implications


After the Arab Spring, many leaders in the region have been wary of popular uprisings boiling over into neighbouring states.  The Sudanese people are currently locked in a political struggle with their repressive government, but these political movements have yet to inspire struggles elsewhere.


Largely this is due to the political situation in Algeria, and its unique position in having a weak, long-serving head of government.


The current protests have thrown various deals into question and many countries are unsure of what to expect next.  Bouteflika was influential in returning Algeria to the international stage, and he focused on building strong relations with other developing countries while also playing both sides and remaining on good terms with Europe and America.  Bouteflika built close relations with China and Brazil, and he opened up the country to oil and gas exportation.


Algeria’s business and foreign allies will be watching developments in the country with a close eye, and if the situation becomes too unstable it could wreak havoc on the economy.  The next government will have to focus on securing the safety of political opposition, so the Algerian people can begin building a more inclusive and economically viable future.  Both a leadership vacuum and ignoring the will of the people would doom Algeria to a similar fate as other unfortunate neighbours.



Two competing diplomatic meetings were held on February 14, clearly drawing the lines for different strategies in the Middle East. 

Many analysts classified the United States-led conference as anti-Iran, and the event divided the United States from its European allies.  Turkey and Iran attended Russia’s Sochi summit on the future of the Syrian war, and in many ways, it was a direct response to America’s tough stance on Iran.

Unfortunately for the United States, not all of its allies were on board with the messaging of the meeting with many European nations sending low-level diplomats.  The one noticeable big European name in attendance was the United Kingdom’s Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt.

Pressuring European nations to reject the 2015 Iran nuclear deal seemed to be on the top of the agenda for the Americans.  At the meeting in Warsaw and later in the week at the Munich Security Conference, Vice President Mike Pence called on European leaders to follow America’s lead and pull out of the Iranian nuclear deal.  But, this hard line on Iran did not go down well with European allies, and leaders from the European Union and crucial member states Germany, France, and the United Kingdom all reiterated their commitment to a diplomatic solution with Iran.

While the White House failed to convince the Europeans to join their bloc, the conference did clearly outline once again who is on America’s side.  Israel and Saudi Arabia are the biggest players pushing for a tougher stance on Iran.  Saudi Arabia leads a group of Gulf states pushing for an anti-Iran foreign policy strategy and is in conflict with Iran on a myriad of foreign policy issues including Qatar, Syria, and Yemen.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was one of the biggest players at the Warsaw conference, however, his appearance and communication on the event will have done little to convince European allies to join their anti-Iran alliance.  Netanyahu tweeted a statement referencing “the common interest of war with Iran”.  The tweet was later deleted and “war with” was replaced by “combating” in order to tone down their messaging.

Despite the gaffe, Netanyahu did seek further rapprochement at the Warsaw meeting with other countries within the anti-Iran bloc.  Netanyahu met with Oman’s foreign minister, but both Israel and Oman have said formal ties between the two countries are yet to be formally established.

Sochi Conference

Russia’s conference in Sochi featured a much different and more united tone than could be found in Warsaw.  Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the same day America called on its allies to join forces to put sanctions on Iran.

The three nations’ primary concern was the Syrian conflict.  All three countries have troops involved in the war and support holding peace talks to end the bloody conflict.  However, the meeting did highlight some of the differences the three countries have in terms of strategy.

Turkey backs a rebel group while Russia and Iran have been supportive of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.  Turkey also supports a more cautious approach compared to the other two conference attendees in large part because a large offensive could deepen the refugee crisis spilling into Turkey.

While the United States is divided with its allies over Iran, Russia and Turkey have taken the opportunity to deepen cooperation with Iran in attempt to have more say over the end of the Syrian conflict and the Middle East as a whole.  American President Donald Trump’s commitment to remove American troops from the region will cause some problems for participants in the conflict, but it assures other actors a bigger seat at the table.


The Middle East’s near geopolitical future is currently divided on the issue of Iran.  Saudi Arabia’s Gulf state coalition has firm backing from the United States, however, America’s isolation from its western allies is becoming more clearly defined.  The United States will have to stomach strained ties with European nations who have taken a firm stance on the Iran nuclear deal.

On the other hand, Russia and Turkey are enjoying increased relations with Iran, a country isolated from many potential regional partners.  A Russia-Turkey-Iran coalition stands to gain influence in the Middle East if America’s partnerships begin to crumble.

In the wake of the duelling conferences, Iranian President Rouhani made overtures to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf counterparts.  Saudi Arabia and Iran are locked in multiple proxy wars, but Iran has been appealing to Saudi Arabia to lessen their alliance with America and turn toward Iran for cooperation in the region.

Iran’s overtures have mostly fallen on deaf ears, and Saudi Arabia has given little indication that they are receptive to such ideas, and Iran and Saudi Arabia will continue as enemies.  However, with America’s foreign policy strategies frequently changing on a whim, Middle East alliances could reshape quickly if the wrong moves are made.



United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo took a whirlwind, week-long diplomatic tour of seven Middle Eastern countries to offer reassurances to the region after President Donald Trump announced a withdrawal of American troops from Syria.

Pompeo visited Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Oman in that order.

Unsurprisingly, Pompeo covered more than just Syria and America’s sudden foreign policy shift, and he took on a broad range of issues.  In this article, we will analyse the most important topics discussed and what potential ramifications they have on regional diplomacy.

Syria and the Islamic State

First, Pompeo had to manoeuvre around President Trump’s Syria withdrawal announcement and the President’s praise to American troops in Iraq for the “near elimination of the ISIS territorial caliphate in Iraq and in Syria.”

At his first stop in Jordan, Pompeo said, “the most significant threats to the region are Daesh and the Islamic revolution.” 

But, several days after Pompeo returned to the United States, Vice President Mike Pence remarked, “the caliphate has crumbled, and ISIS has been defeated.”

Pompeo faced an uphill battle in clarifying Trump’s statements and positions, and the mixed messaging diminishes the word of the Secretary of State.  Pompeo’s mission was to assuage Middle East allies and convince them that the United States will scale back their presence in Syria slower than first anticipated.

However, the sudden nature of Trump’s withdrawal announcement and Pompeo’s subsequent tour will do little to change the reality that the region will have to make preparations for a multitude of potential and abrupt policy changes from the United States.


Pompeo did make one issue loud and clear during his diplomatic visits: Iran is a shared enemy of America and its Middle Eastern allies.  Pompeo and National Security Advisor John Bolton have both previously advocated for regime change in Iran, and they represent America’s newly reinvigorated hawkish approach to the Shia state.

Amongst other political uncertainties and America’s new approach to Syria, the heads of state on Pompeo’s tour likely were happy to hear consistent and strong messaging on Iran.

In Cairo, Pompeo had particularly strong words for Iran as he said the United States and its allies will “expel every last Iranian boot from Syria.”

This was an attempt to offer some reassurance on the United States’ commitment to Syria, but it also made clear that Pompeo and the White House will continue to focus on the perceived threat from Iran.  The White House’s vendetta against Iran comes as no surprise considering President Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and the reintroduction of harsh sanctions against Iran.

Qatari Blockade and Saudi Arabia

Pompeo also used the Iran talking point to pivot toward Qatar’s conflict with its neighbours.  The Qatari state is currently locked in a diplomatic battle with and being blockaded by a Saudi-led coalition who accuses Qatar of collaborating with Iran.

In the Qatari capital, the Secretary of State put a case forward for working in a united front against the threat from Iran.  Pompeo argued that the blockade on Qatar aided Iran, but the United States has been an unsuccessful mediator between Qatar and the Saudi-led coalition.

In Pompeo’s visit to Saudi Arabia, he spoke with Saudi crown prince Mohammed Bin Salman for nearly an hour.  Pompeo said he spoke with MBS about the wars in Yemen and Syria, the Qatari blockade, and the Jamal Khashoggi case.

Similar to previous Trump foreign policy with the Saudis, Pompeo emphasised the relationship between the two states before launching into any criticism of the Saudi state for its actions.  Saudi Arabia remains an important ally to the Trump White House on their shared goal of containing Iran, and this agreement seems to take importance over other issues.

Pompeo and the State Department have not been able to effectively convince the Saudis to end their blockade with Qatar.  But based on the talking points of Pompeo’s visit, ending the blockade will be a continued desire of the White House in its attempts to further damage Iran.

Pompeo also reiterated that there has been no change in the White House’s stance on the Khashoggi case despite the United States Congress adopting a more hard line view.


Overall, Pompeo’s Middle East trip was an attempt to steady tumultuous relationships and provide reassurances to allies.

In terms of the American withdrawal of troops from Syria, Pompeo’s visit did little to offer any concrete reassurances on the White House’s opinion on the matter of Syria and the Islamic State.  Conflicting statements from the White House and the State Department leaves America’s Middle Eastern allies in a similarly confused position as many analysts.  In this respect, preparing for multiple, uncertain scenarios is a wise and necessary move.

One clear takeaway is that the Trump White House wants to continue to work with Saudi Arabia and other regional partners to control Iran.  This is not a new foreign policy position for the United States, however, President’s Trump’s fervour in containing Iran seems to extend further than many previous presidents.

The Qatari blockade is no closer to being lifted, but the United States does seem keen to restore economic certainty to Qatar.  However, Pompeo reiterated the importance of the Saudi-American ‘friendship’, so Saudi Arabia still takes precedence over Qatar.



The United Arab Emirates pardoned British Ph.D. student Matthew Hedges on November 26th after holding him in prison on spy charges.  The UAE accused the British academic of being a member of the MI6 due to his network of connections within the country, however, they bowed to international pressure to justify their allegations and instead released Hedges.

While the case may be over for Hedges, who returned to his wife in England, the UAE still faces further ramifications and trade between the two countries may be more tenuous than before.

The UAE faced an international campaign from Hedges’ wife, Daniela Tejada, and were feeling pressure from British foreign secretary Jeremy Hunt. 

The Emirates attempted to save face by holding press conferences detailing their suspicions and alleged Hedges took advantage of their country’s openness to academics.  The UAE also provided short video clips of Hedges including one where he admits to having the nonexistent rank of captain in MI6.

The public nature of the Emirate’s actions indicates a potential shift in relations between the two countries.

The UAE is a strong British trade and regional partner and according to the UK Office for National Statistics is Britain’s 23rd leading imports partner (£4.8 billion) and 13th leading exports partner (£9.8 billion). They also buy £250 million worth of British-made weapons every year.

But, the UAE, guided by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, have strayed from their long-standing British partnership in favour of more hard power responses to regional politics.

While the UK and UAE have largely agreed on regional politics in recent years, under Prime Minister Theresa May, the UAE has started to become a more difficult partner.

The Yemeni Civil War and the Qatari blockade are two examples of the Emirates’ switch from international cooperation with the UK to a more active hard power force.  In both of these cases, the UAE is following Saudi Arabia’s lead.

In Yemen, the UAE is part of a Saudi-led coalition fighting with the Yemeni government against Houthi rebels.  The Saudi coalition has been accused of war crimes and targeting civilians in the drawn-out war.

The Saudi and Emirati are equipped with American and British weapons, so while the countries are not directly involved in the conflict, many have accused the Western leaders of being complicit in an increasingly bloody war.

Crown Prince Zayed has also teamed up with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States to isolate Qatar through a blockade.

Saudi Arabia and its allies are upset with Qatar’s alignment with Iran, and the Saudi-led coalition issued Qatar with 13 demands before the blockade would be lifted.

Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have ramped up their language against Qatar since the blockade.  Both have threatened to dump nuclear waste near Qatar, and Saudi Arabia has said they are planning to dig a ditch and build a canal in order to make Qatar a completely isolated island.

Here again, the UK government is in opposition to the actions of the UAE, and the government supports Kuwaiti-led mediation appeals.

Coupled with other recent international incidents, Saudi Arabia and the UAE seem empowered by American President Donald Trump’s aversion to condemning human rights abuses and other transgressions by the two countries. 

So, May’s government and the United Kingdom have to carefully balance themselves between the emboldened actions of their Middle Eastern trade and political partners and the resulting international condemnation due to the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s actions.

The case of Matthew Hedges may have been a test to see how far the Emirates can go without risking the trade partnership with the United Kingdom.  Eventually, the UAE caved and released the British national, but the saga highlights growing tensions, and it perhaps gives the United Kingdom further fuel to decrease ties with the Emirates.

However, the Emirates and Saudi Arabia are keenly aware of the political situation in the UK.   An uncertain exit from the European Union and a potentially weakened trading position with their European partners does not leave May’s government much room to make demands out of the Emirates.

Furthermore, the current political situation in the United States seems to indicate that decreased Gulf Region trade with Britain could shift into American hands.

While Emirati-British relations may be momentarily strained, one would expect trade deals and political alliances to remain similarly organized in the near future.  But if domestic politics shift in the UK, US or other regions, then British business with the UAE might see significant change.

In the bigger picture, the academic’s case may end up being a mere blip in the strong relations between two trade partners.

However, regional analysts will be keeping a keen eye on the UAE’s international diplomacy as the case threw light on a diplomatic relationship that could see change in the coming years.



After acquittals in Bahrain’s highest criminal court, an appeals court sentenced three senior opposition leaders to life in prison.

Al-Wefaq leader Sheikh Ali Salman, Sheikh Hassan Sultan and Ali al-Aswad were sentenced on November 4.  The trio was charged with hostile acts and “communicating with Qatari officials… to overthrow constitutional order,” according to a statement from the public prosecutor.

Al-Wefaq is one of Bahrain’s largest political parties, and in 2010 parliamentary elections they received 64% of the popular vote.  However, the party only received 18 of 40 seats in the lower house, and they have now been banned for competing in parliamentary elections later this month.

Despite election popularity, the party is considered an opposition party because Bahrain is a constitutional monarchy with the monarchy enjoying concentrated power.  King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa appoints the government, and Bahrain has had the same prime minister, Prince Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, since 1971.  Al Khalifa is the current longest-serving prime minister in the world.

After the 2010 parliamentary elections, Al-Wefaq has been struggling in its opposition role.  In 2016, Bahrain’s courts ordered the group to be dissolved, suspended the group’s activities and froze their assets.

Al-Wefaq is so precariously positioned in Bahraini politics because not only are they the government’s opposition, but they are the Shia opposition to the Sunni monarchy.  Religious differences have been a driver for disagreements between the two factions.  Sunni allies Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have come to Bahrain’s aid in stamping out the country’s Shia opposition, including a 2011 uprising.

The allegation of an Al-Wefaq conspiracy with Qatar comes at a tense time between Qatar and its regional neighbours.  Friction between Qatar and its neighbours boils down an issue similar to Bahrain and its Shia opposition.

Qatar has a Shia majority like many neighbouring countries, but Saudi Arabia and other regional powers are upset with Qatar pivoting toward an alliance with Iran.  When the Saudi-led consortium of states issued the blockade against Qatar they listed 13 demands for Qatar to abide by, prominently including curbing ties with Iran.

Bahrain joined in on the Qatari blockade and is now turning their ire once again to Doha through the accusations against their opposition leaders.  Qatar has denied participating in collusion with Al-Wefaq and the foreign ministry condemned the allegation that Qatar was meddling in Bahraini internal politics.

In the 13 demands, the blockading countries also required Qatar to cease meddling in internal politics of other states.

Linking Al-Wefaq to Qatar is a calculated move on behalf of Bahrain, and it delegitimizes two opponents at once.  If proven to be true, Qatar would be violating several of the conditions to end the blockade, and Al-Wefaq would be conspiring with an unfriendly state.

This development also comes before parliamentary elections in late November.  Bahrain has gone further than banning opposition parties as they are now neutralizing their leadership through the judicial process.

The United States and the United Kingdom have publicly denounced Bahrain for its electoral repression, but the state has been emboldened by the Qatari blockade.

Unhindered by international condemnation, the Bahraini regime has sentenced other opposition activists to jail sentences ranging from three to 10 years.  Along with the sentencing for opposition leaders, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have declared the actions of Bahrain are unjust.

Bahrain has Western international opinion against them, however, their regional allies will not come out against the move.  In October, Bahrain supported Saudi Arabia after the Jamal Khashoggi case became an international story.  Bahrain and Saudi Arabia will remain close through thick and thin.

In terms of Western allies, Bahrain has complicated ties to the United States.  America expressed concern about Bahrain’s upcoming elections, but it is unimaginable that the White House will interfere considering the ties between the countries.

Bahrain expelled American Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Tom Malinowski after he visited with Al-Wefaq leaders in 2014.  The Bahraini government accused Malinowski of operating counter to diplomatic norms, and the diplomat argued Bahrain was attempting to suppress a dialogue.

But, US Secretary of Defense James Mattis seems more magnanimous in his approach to Bahrain and the region.  Mattis gave a policy speech in Bahrain in late October, during which he condemned both the Khashoggi killing and the “hysterical” global reaction.

Defense Secretary Mattis is a staunch opponent of Iran, and President Trump has expressed support for the Saudi regime.  Some American senators may express concern about Bahraini elections and Saudi Arabian transgressions, but that concern is unlikely to be shared by the White House.

In the short term, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are benefitting from a cozy relationship with the United States, and opposition leaders are struggling.  But, they run the risk of enraging a large segment of the American and international community who may take up positions against Trump for posterity’s sake.