Turkey and the Qatar Crisis. An Analysis.
In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt cut political and economic ties with Qatar over an accusation that it supports terrorism in the region. Qatar, a small Gulf country that tries to pursue an “independent” foreign policy, has been under intense pressure by the Saudi camp. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and UAE accused Qatar of sponsoring terrorism in the region several times in the past and even withdrew their diplomatic missions in 2014 for eight months. But this time the Saudi Camp has more support in the region and appears to be more aggressive. Qatar’s policymakers are now in a difficult position. Their domestic legitimacy and international standing will significantly weaken if they submit to the Saudi camp, but will face a political and economic isolation if they don’t.
Turkish President Erdogan harshly criticised the Saudi-led sanctions, immediately started delivering food supplies to the country and quickly ratified a previously signed military agreement to deploy troops to a Turkish military base in Qatar.
Turkey and Qatar already had strong ties before the crisis. Their foreign policies have been in alignment in most critical issues threatening the region. Both Turkey and Qatar have opposed the military coup in Egypt that carried Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to power, refused to recognise Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist organisations, and provided support for the rebel groups that fight against the Assad regime in Syria. Moreover, to the dismay of Saudi Arabia, which views Iran as a major security threat to its livelihood and thus aims to isolate it, Turkey and Qatar refuse to distance themselves from Iran.
Thus, what brings Turkey and Qatar closer is their similar foreign policy orientations in the region. The Erdogan administration doesn’t have many allies left in the region with a similar foreign policy outlook and is likely to face further political isolation in if it loses Qatar.
There are also additional reasons that might explain why Turkey backs Qatar in the conflict. On 18 December 2016, during one of their frequent meetings, Qatari Emir Al Thani signed an arms trade deal with Erdogan, agreeing to buy $2 billion worth of arms from Turkey. Qatar’s strong reserves serve as a foreign policy tool for the country. Such deals, whilst helping Qatar to diversify its arms suppliers, are particularly important for Erdogan as his administration which has been heavily investing in domestic arms production with a declared aim to change Turkey from being an ‘arms importer’ to an ‘exporter.’ The arms deal with Qatar in this regard sends a signal to Erdogan’s conservative supporters that the country is on the right track.
Qatar also serves as an emergency energy supplier for Turkey, which is located in an unstable political neighbourhood and has to rely on Russia and Iran for its energy needs. But this means that Turkey’s energy security is always at risk. Qatar provided liquefied gas to Turkey when its gas supplies were threatened after it shot down a Russian warplane in November 2015, demonstrating how important it is for Turkey to have a reliable energy supplier at the times of crisis.
Qatar also provides an investment platform for Turkish companies that have lost their market shares in Libya, Egypt, Russia, Iraq, and Syria. This is especially important for the Turkish construction industry, which is one of the most prominent sectors in Turkey and dominated by contractors with close ties to Erdogan. The Turkish construction industry has already set its sights on the $170 billion investment budget that Qatar has allocated for its hosting of the 2022 World Cup. In fact, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Simsek recently said: “Turkish contractors have undertaken projects worth $13.7 billion in Qatar. Qatar is according positive discrimination to Turkey not only in words but also in deeds, giving strong support to Turkish companies doing business there… I’d like to also underline that we are ready to provide any contribution to our Qatari friends in the 2022 World Cup organization.” (http://www.atimes.com/article/qatari-money-rise-turkey/)
It should be noted that Turkey’s support to Qatar is primarily motivated by political concerns, not by economic ones. In fact, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have always been a more important economic partner for Turkey and the Erdogan administration has been trying to further improve Turkey’s economic relations with them. According to the World Bank trade data, Turkey’s exports to the UAE totalled $4.7 billion and to Saudi Arabia $3.5 billion in 2015, while the same figure for Qatar was only $423 million. (http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/TUR/Year/2015/TradeFlow/EXPIMP/Partner/SAU/Product/all-groups) But there are now social media campaigns in Saudi Arabia and the UAE that call people to boycott Turkish products. (http://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/calls-from-saudi-arabia-and-uae-to-boycott-products-of-turkey-amid-qatar-crisis-163961.html). There are also reports that the Al-Sisi government in Egypt has asked the Saudi-led coalition to apply economic sanctions against Turkey. (https://www.middleeastobserver.org/2017/06/16/37406/)
Because Turkey’s foreign policy orientation is similar to that of Qatar, it delivers a great blow to Turkey’s international legitimacy and standing if Qatar submits to the Saudi camp. But Turkey has also no intention of upsetting its relations with Saudi Arabia and its allies like the UAE. Having said this Ankara cannot assume a mediator role in the crisis because of its involvement in Qatar. This is why Erdogan’s July 23-24 visit to Gulf countries may be interpreted as a damage control attempt by Erdogan to show that Turkey’s involvement in Qatar is not an anti-Saudi move and his administration would like to maintain good relations with the Saudi camp. The problem lies in the fact that Turkey has already become a party to the conflict. At the moment, the Erdogan administration can only hope that the mediation efforts undertaken by Kuwait and the United States will resolve the crisis on favourable terms to Turkey.